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EDWARD J. EBERLE*
The German Idea of Freedom
The modem German constitution (known as the
Grundgesetz (GG) or Basic Law)' posits a social order that
has striking similarities with the constitution familiar to
many in the western world: the United States Constitution.
Both charters overlap in structural conception in that each
contains a catalog of basic, fundamental rights; a federalist
structure of government divided between federal and state
authority and a federal government separated into three
coordinate branches; 2 a bicameral legislature representing
* Distinguished Research Professor of Law, Roger Williams University
School of Law. Copyright by Edward J. Eberle, 2007. All rights
reserved. I would like to thank Matt Costa and Ashley Taylor for their
valuable research assistance. The title of this paper appears also as the
title of Leonard Krieger's book, THE GERMAN IDEA OF FREEDOM
(1957), which provides helpful historical background on the origins of
many of the ideas developed in this article. All translations are mine,
unless otherwise noted.
1 The constitution is known as the Basic Law because it was adopted,
in 1949, when Germany was divided. Upon reunification in 1990,
Germans kept the term Basic Law, instead of Constitution, to
symbolize the success of the Basic Law in West Germany.
2 The German federal government is divided between three
coordinate branches: the legislature, executive, and judiciary.
Provision for independent judicial review by the Constitutional Court is
explicitly laid out in the Basic Law, Grundgesetz ffir die
Bundesrepublik Deutschland (federal constitution) GRUNDGESETZ
[GG] [Constitution] art. 93, 97 (F.R.G.). The German states or Lander
also maintain their autonomy in affairs central to them, share
concurrent legislative jurisdiction with the federal legislature, GG art.
72, 74, and share power in executing federal laws and regulations.
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the people in forms of republican democracy; 3 and an
independent judiciary with the power of judicial review that
includes the ability to declare the concrete meaning of the
higher law, notwithstanding democratic determinations to
the contrary. On this last point, Germany and the United
States are two of the leading experiments in having the
judiciary determine ultimate fundamental law. These
common traits place Germany and the United States firmly
within western constitutional culture.
More interesting than these similarities are the
differences in the constitutional visions of the two
countries. The American constitutional vision is centered
around human liberty, which is secured through a focus on
governmental structure grounded in the separation of
powers and designed to both horizontally (dividing the
federal government into three branches) and vertically
(dividing government between federal and state
governments) limit authority and thereby empower people
to live their lives largely as they determine, free from
governmental restraint. Structural limitation of official
power is complemented by guarantees of fundamental
rights, empowering people to act as they choose within the
constructs of those rights and, thereby, check authority in a
personal way. This is what I refer to as a "constitution of
liberty.' 4  Pursuant to this constitutional scheme, liberty
means essentially the freedom to pursue one's own vision
3 The German legislature consists of two houses, the Bundestag,
which is the federal parliament, elected by the people, and the
Bundesrat, which consists of members appointed by the Lander. The
German form of bicameralism is thus somewhat akin to the United
States before the adoption of the seventeenth amendment, in 1913,
which provided for the election of Senators. Prior to the seventeenth
amendment, the States determined who would represent them in the
Senate.
4 EDWARD J. EBERLE, DIGNITY AND LIBERTY: CONSTITUTIONAL
VISIONS OF GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 7 (2002) [hereinafter
EBERLE, DIGNITY AND LIBERTY].
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in life, as one chooses. The American Constitution posits
no particular normative order that government must realize
or people must live within. We may thus refer to the
American Constitution as being value-neutral.
Accordingly, people are basically free to pursue their own
interests. And many Americans have done so, interpreting
this idea of freedom to mean free reign over their personal
matters and free pursuit of their economic interests in a free
market secured by law that induces stable party
expectations. At its core, the American idea of freedom
aims for freedom from government.
The German idea of freedom is different than the
American, and it is this difference that is the subject of this
article. In our global, often interdependent, world it is
worthwhile to consider alternative ways of organizing a
constitutional order in order to see different perspectives,
compare it against native ways, and assess, the strength and
weaknesses of each system. These are all main missions of
comparative law. Comparing the law of one country to the
law of another country leads to insight and sometimes,
illumination.
So, what is it about the German idea of freedom that is
different from the American? And does the difference lead
to more freedom, more fulfillment or more social harmony?
First, and most fundamentally, the German constitution is
anchored in the architectonic value of human dignity,5
meaning, at least, that each person is valuable per se as an
end in himself, which government and fellow citizens must
give due respect. The influence of the Kantian maxim,
"[a]ct so that you treat humanity, whether in your own
person or in that of another, always as an end and never as
5 GG art. 1(1) (translated by Christian Tomuschat and David Currie
and published by the Press and Information Office of the Federal
Republic of Germany, "The dignity of man shall be inviolable. To
respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.")
OREGON REVIEW OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 10, 2008]
a means only" 6 is clear (although it would be an
overstatement to say the GG is simply Kantian), and this
gives rise to a German "constitution of dignity," as
compared to the American constitution of liberty.
One obvious difference between the two is that the
German constitution is value-ordered around the norm of
dignity, whereas the American charter is value-neutral
based on an idea of liberty rooted in personal choice.
Because dignity is the core animating principle of the
German constitution, it radiates throughout the
constitutional order. The idea of dignity radiates
prominently in the multitude of basic rights set forth in
articles 2 through 19 of the GG. Of these, a notable
difference from the American conception of rights is the
article 2(1) guarantee "to the free development of...
personality," another Kantian inspiration which parallels
American autonomy rights over matters of basic human
existence, such as abortion, human sexuality and family
choice, but also operates as a reservoir of human freedom, a
fail-safe, addressing elements of human freedom not
captured by more specific basic rights. Personality rights
center on development of human capacity and protection of
a person's interior life, made concrete through protections
like control over information personal to an individual,
such as inquiry into habits and activities and rightful
portrayal, rightful quotation and rightful honor of a person.
A central focus of German rights is preservation of the
integrity and security of a person.
Another difference is that rights are coupled with
duties, an obligation common in European constitutional
6 IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
WITH CRITICAL ESSAYS 47 (Lewis White Beck trans., 1959)
[hereinafter KANT, FOUNDATIONS].
7 EBERLE, DIGNITY AND LIBERTY, supra note 4, at 7.
The German Idea of Freedom
orders but foreign to the American constitutional scheme. 8
The idea of coupling rights with duties reflects, again, a
value-ordered constitution, as compared to a value-neutral
one.
The dignitarian value-ordering of the German
constitution is also evident in the close interaction between
public and private law. Since human dignity constitutes the
architectonic principle of the German legal system, it
radiates into and affects private law and, indeed, the whole
legal system. Under this doctrine, known as Third Party
Effect (Drittwirkung), the norms of the GG enter into and
influence the norms of private law, as the norms of private
law can do the same with respect to constitutional law. The
legal system as a whole operates in tandem.
There are also two important German ideas relating to
government structure that are unique and worth examining.
The first of these is the idea of a Rechtsstaat, which is often
taken to mean a state committed to the rule of law. But the
idea of the Rechtsstaat is more complicated than that; it
means, among other things, a state committed to reason,
rationality, neutrality, equality and fair notice of impending
legal measures. We might think of the Rechtsstaat as
committing the state to an exterior, extrinsic system of
reason, which constrains and directs authority along a
preestablished path of ideas.
The second structural idea is that of the Social State
(Sozialstaat), which obligates the state to provide for the
security of its citizens, including a minimal level of
existence. The Sozialstaat is the anchoring principle of
social welfare, but also means much more. At its core, it
8 For example, the GG article 6(2) guarantee of child rearing states:
"The care and upbringing of children shall be a natural right of and a
duty primarily incumbent on the parents." And while GG article 14
guarantees property and the rights of inheritance, "Property imposes
duties. Its use should also serve the public weal." GG art. 14(2).
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means that the state must protect the general welfare of its
citizens and the society.
So, by way of summary, we can identify these core
traits of the German idea of freedom: human dignity,
development of personality, rights coupled with duties,
Third Party Effect, Rechtsstaat and Sozialstaat. The
article will proceed as follows: Part I examines the
substance of these concepts in contemporary law and
excavates their historical and cultural roots. We will see
the different shades of meaning the concepts have
historically taken on through different milieus and today.
Part II will then assemble the constituent parts of, and
assess, the vision put forth by the German idea of freedom.
Part III concludes by contrasting the German and American
ideas of freedom.
I
THE GERMAN IDEA OF FREEDOM: HISTORY AND
COMPONENTS
There is a long history of constitutionalism in Germany,
but it is of a variety different than the Anglo-American
version. Starting at least with the German Bund, in 1815,
Germans sought a way to enshrine certain fundamentals of
a social order, limiting absolute authority and, in turn,
empowering other elements of society, such as the
aristocracy, the church and the burger class with authority
to help govern society. 9 The focus of German activity in
9 Constitutional review appeared in a beginning form during the Holy
Roman Empire with the establishment, in 1495, of the
Reichskammergericht. The Reichskammergericht was created at the
instigation of Maximilian I as a way to defuse tension between warring
princes and achieve some peace and unity among the different
principalities. In the seventeenth century, the Imperial Court, and other
courts, enforced the rights of the Estates against princes. In modern
form, constitutionalism emerged in the nineteenth century, again
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the nineteenth century was mainly on governmental
structure and the different estates of society, reflecting the
transition from European feudalism to premodern and,
later, modern society. Decisive in this shift was, of course,
the 1789 French Revolution, which inspired calls to
national liberty in Germany, and throughout Europe.
Kant, as others, was inspired by the French turn of
events, and also Adam Smith, and this is decisive for the
history of German constitutionalism as Kant had a seminal
influence in the German idea of freedom, as we have
already observed and will continue to do so.1 ° Other
focusing on resolving governmental structural disputes. The German
Bund of 1815 (a confederation of north German states) was an early
example of providing means to resolve and define the respective rights
of the sovereign states. This conception of constitutionalism continued
through the Imperial Constitution of 1871, and the Weimar
Constitution of 1919. Structural constitutional issues, of course, are
also a main focus of the GG today. DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY 5 (1989). See also DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 1-8 (1994). A notable
accomplishment of the 1871 Imperial Constitution was the division of
authority among the monarch, parliament, and state authorities in order
to prevent concentration of power in any one body. Id. at 4-5.
Professor Ewald observes that many people tend to view Germany of
the eighteenth and nineteenth century as conservative and reactionary.
Certainly there is some truth to this. However, we should recognize
Germany's similarity to England at this time: both had a constitutional
monarchy and a parliament where the Estates of the Realm were
represented. Moreover, Germany had a "Rechtsstaat with a flourishing
diversity of political parties; indeed, in the closing years of the century
the German Social Democrats set the European standard for democratic
political reform." William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (I):
What Was It Like to Try a Rat?, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1889, 2052 (1995).
10 The ideas of Adam Smith were first introduced into Germany at
the University of Hannover, leading to an "advocacy of economic
liberty." At the University of K6nigsberg, Kant with his friend
Professor Christian Jacob Kraus "reflected the connection between an
individualistic ethic with liberal political implications and an
enthusiastic rendering of Adam Smith." KLnigsberg became a leading
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thinkers had prominent roles in formulating the German
idea of freedom as well, including Friedrich Karl von
Savigny, Georg Friedrich Hegel, and Otto von Gierke. Yet,
no figure is as important as Kant. Kant's influence is
decisive in many of the concepts we have previously
mentioned, including human dignity, human personality,
rights coupled with duties and the Rechtsstaat, to name a
few. We will have more to say about Kant later. But for
now we need to sketch the outlines of the history of
German constitutionalism in order to appreciate better the
roots of what has become the German idea of freedom.
Kant believed a constitutional monarchy was the best
form of government, and this was a common view of the
late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries."1 A monarch was
above the state and politics, beholden to no one, and thus
was neutral. The excesses and terror of the French
Revolution led to skepticism, if not fear, of the vagaries of
democracy. 12 Likewise, there was fear of the excesses of
economic capitalism brought about by early nineteenth
century English laissezfaire; Germans feared its appeal to
base human motives of greed and arrogance and the
center of liberalism, perhaps on account of its distance from the
German heartland. LEONARD KRIEGER, THE GERMAN IDEA OF
FREEDOM: HISTORY OF A POLITICAL TRADITION 25-26 (1957). Id. at
87, 104, 111 (describing the influence of Rousseau and French
Revolution on Kant).
"I d. at 121-23.
12 Professor Ewald observes that Germans of this period distrusted
democracy out of fear of rule by the tyranny of the majority, which
would trammel individual liberty as much as absolutism. Many leading
German thinkers, like Kant, viewed both as forms of despotism. Of
course, these thoughts were shared by others, like Adam Smith and
James Madison. Thus, the trick was how to preserve a liberalism of the
person with limitation of state authority and a stable political field.
Ewald, supra note 9, at 2053. This would lead to the German focus on
protection of the individual and his faculties.
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inequality that would ensue. 13 Germans sought a more
secure and stable basis on which to erect society. In the
period before the 1848 revolution (inspired by the French
Revolution of 1848), most German thinkers desired a stable
social structure, accepting the monarchy and aristocracy as
the legacy of German tradition. Instead, their focus on
freedom lie in the human spirit and inner dimension of
personality, such as development of human capacity,
human autonomy and human will. The protection of
freedom was sought more through the rule of law than
through the form of government.
The constitutions of the southern states--Baden,
Wiirttemberg, and Bavaria--echoed the tenor of the more
liberal French Constitution of 1789, as these southern states
posited a more western orientation than was common in
German territory. The real movement for democracy took
place in 1848 with the German revolution. Democrats met
in Frankfurt, at St. Paul's Church, and drafted a democratic
constitution. But the democratic movement was squelched,
and one of its leading proponents, Robert Blum, executed14
by Prussian authorities. Nevertheless, certain ideas of the
1849 St. Paul's Church Constitution survive today, having
been picked up by the 1919 Weimar Constitution and now
the 1949 GG. German territory was formally united in
1871 under Bismarck, a late unification for Europe. The
1871 Constitution typically focused on government
structure and consolidated the forces of society; it was not a
democratic constitution. " The imperial structure of
Germany survived until the country's defeat in World War
13 JAMES Q. WHITMAN, THE LEGACY OF ROMAN LAW IN THE
GERMAN ROMANTIC ERA 234 (1990) [hereinafter WHITMAN, ROMAN
LEGACY].
14 Biographical Information on Robert Blum, available at
www.ohiou.edu/-Chastain/ac/blum.htm; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Robert-Blum (last visited Nov. 15, 2006).15 CURRIE, supra note 9, at 4-5.
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I. The aftermath of the war led to Germany's first
democratic constitution governing the whole land, the 1919
Constitution of Weimar, which is famed for its careful
thought and elegance. The Weimar Constitution ultimately
failed because of its complicated formula for forming a
government, which Hitler was able to exploit amidst the
despair of the Great Depression in the 1930s. It took the
catastrophe of World War II to obliterate Hitler and the
legacy of tradition, aristocracy and conservative authority,
and provide Germans with an opportunity to re-found
society, as Hegel had predicted. 16
The GG heralded a new vision for Germany, combining
the historical focus on the inner development of man with
the western idea of democracy. It is this unique
combination of focus on man's moral autonomy and
development with democratic self-determination that
comprises the German idea of freedom that we must now
investigate. To do this, we must examine carefully the
central conceptions that comprise the idea-dignity,
personality, rights and duties, Third Party Effect,
Rechtsstaat and Sozialstaat. We will examine their
contemporaneous meaning in the GG, and then evaluate
their origins and historical evolution to see how they have
influenced modern versions of the concepts.
A. Dignity
Dignity is a primary concept in the GG, as the
refounding principle of post-World War II Germany, in
article 1(1), which states the guiding principle as, "The
dignity of man shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it
shall be the duty of all state authority." The influence of
16 KRIEGER, supra note 10, at 138. Of course, it would take the rule
of Hitler to bust apart the German tradition of conservatism and
authority and, in the wake of the Hitler catastrophe, a blank slate that
provided an opportunity to re-found German society.
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Kant here is obvious, as the Germans sought to anchor the
social order to the universal and timeless ideal of human
beings possessing intrinsic worth and, therefore, to be
valued for who they are, as ends in themselves, and not for
ulterior purposes. 17 We might say the anchoring of the GG
to dignity is simply its mooring in Kant's ethical scheme-
"Man... is not a thing, and thus not something to be used
merely as a means; he must always be regarded in all his
actions as an end in himself."' 8 So viewed, Kantian
dignitarian ethics form a guiding principle of the GG, an
ideal around which the whole legal order has been
reconceived. Kant, in fact, would appear to be the
dominant influence on German law, both public and
private. And, in view of his influence, Kantian
interpretation can be as varied as a chameleon. But it
would be a mistake to view the GG as being only a Kantian
influenced charter. Christian natural law, secular theories
of autonomy and social democratic thought were also
17 Certainly constitutional law scholars of the 1950s, in the early
years of the GG, were heavily influenced by Kant. James Q. Whitman,
Enforcing Civility and Respect: Three Societies, 109 YALE L.J. 1279,
1322, 1339 (2000) [hereinafter Whitman, Civility and Respect].
Perhaps this was out of a desire to put the Hitler past behind.
Perhaps we might date the phrase human dignity to the Italian
Renaissance, specifically 1486, as Professor Ewald asserts. Ewald,
supra note 9, at 1919. Restoring the "honor and dignity of Rome" was
certainly a driving force of the German private law movement of the
nineteenth century, influenced also by Kant. WHITMAN, ROMAN
LEGACY, supra note 13, at 215. Today, of course, the idea of human
dignity is a commonplace of human rights documents. See, e.g.,
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) (opening:
"Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation
of freedom, justice, and peace in the world.").
18 KANT, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 47.
OREGON REVIEW OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 10, 2008]
important influences, and these forces of interpretation, and
others, are always in flux. 19
We get some sense of the German commitment to
dignity in a sampling of the work of the
Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG or Constitutional
Court). Because dignity is an abstract concept, it must take
on concrete meaning through interpretation, as provided by
the BVerfG. A representative case is the Life Imprisonment
Case, where the BVerfG elaborated upon the centrality of
human dignity:
It is contrary to human dignity to make the
individual the mere tool (blosses Objekt) of the
state. The principle that "each person must always
be an end in himself' applies unreservedly to all
areas of law; the intrinsic dignity of the person
consists in acknowledging him as an independent
personality.
The constitutional principles of the Basic Law
embrace the respect and protection of human
dignity. The free human person and his dignity are
the highest values of the constitutional order. The
state in all of its forms is obliged to respect and
defend it. This is based on the conception of man as
19 EBERLE, DIGNITY AND LIBERTY, supra note 4, at 41-53; Edward J.
Eberle, Human Dignity, Privacy, and Personality in German and
American Constitutional Law, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 963, 972
[hereinafter Eberle, Human Dignity]. Portions of this part appear in or
are based upon Eberle, Human Dignity, id. and EBERLE, DIGNITY AND
LIBERTY, supra note 4. See also KOMMERS, supra note 9, at 36-37;
BODO PIEROTH & BERNHARD SCHLINK, GRUNDRECHTE STAATSRECHT
II 91 (10th ed. 1994). Dignity, of course, is an extremely vague concept
and must lie within some philosophic tradition. Id. at 92; Whitman,
Civility and Respect, supra note 17, at 1284 (being more skeptical of
view that Kant was primary influence on German law).
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a spiritual-moral being endowed with the freedom
to determine and develop himself.
20
In this sampling of the BVerfG's work, we can discern the
influence of both Kant ("each person must always be an
end in himself') and Christian natural law ("the conception
of man as a spiritual-moral being").
A Kantian influence is likewise evident in the concept
of personhood set forth in the GG, investing a person with
rationality and self-determination, but also with duties and
moral bounds. 2 1  These strands converge to form an
integrated composite of a whole person. People are
spiritual-moral beings who act freely, but their actions are
bound by a sense of moral duty. Actions are to be guided
by a sense of social solidarity, human and social need, and
personal responsibility.
22
There is a strong link in German law between the
concept of personhood and the social community. The
seminal case on artistic freedom, Mephisto, captured this
thought well. The human person is "an autonomous being
developing freely within the social community.' 23 A
person is not to be "an isolated and self-regarding
individual, "but related to and bound by the community." 24
20 Life Imprisonment Case, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG]
[Federal Constitutional Court] (F.R.G), 45 Entscheidungen des
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] 187, 227-28 (1977), translated in
part in CURRIE, supra note 9, at 314; KOMMERS, supra note 9, at 314.
See also GRUNDGESETZ KOMMENTAR 1-21 (Theodor Maunz et al. eds.,
1993) [hereinafter Maunz, KOMMENTAR] (viewing man as an integrated
whole: life-soul-body).
21 Maunz, KOMMENTAR, supra note 20, at 1-25.
22 Eberle, Human Dignity, supra note 19, at 973; Ewald, supra note
9, at 1889, 2000-03, 2059, 2063-64 (1995); KOMMERS, supra note 9, at
313.
23 Mephisto Case, 30 BVerfGE 173, 193 (1971), translated in part in
KOMMERS, supra note 9, at 426.
24 Life Imprisonment, supra note 20, at 227, translated in part in
KOMMERS, supra note 9, at 314.
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The Investment Aid Case first gave content to this concept
of the human as a community-bound person:
The image of man in the Basic Law is not that of an
isolated, sovereign individual; rather, the Basic Law
has decided in favor of a relationship between
individual and community in the sense of a person's
dependence on and commitment to the community,
without infringing upon a person's individual
value.2
5
Thus, the constitutional polity envisioned by the GG is
one where a person's individuality and dignity are to be
guaranteed and nourished, but with a sense of social
solidarity and responsibility. Instead of a collection of
atomistic individuals, people are to be connected to one
another. Individual choice is bounded by community,
civility norms and a sense of responsibility. In short, we
can observe that the root of the German social vision lies in
a moral social construct that both empowers and guides
individuals. The Life Imprisonment Case gives voice to
these ideas:
This freedom within the meaning of the Basic Law
is not that of an isolated and self-regarding
individual but rather [that] of a person related to and
bound by the community. In the light of this
community-boundedness it cannot be "in principle
unlimited." The individual must allow those limits
on his freedom of action that the legislature deems
necessary in the interest of the community's social
life; yet the autonomy of the individual has to be
25 Investment Aid Case, 4 BVerfGE 7, 15-16 (1954), translated in
part in KOMMERS, supra note 9, at 249.
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protected. This means that [the state] must regard
every individual within society with equal worth.26
In re-founding society on rational idealism, particularly
the moral theory of Kant, it is obvious Germans sought to
anchor the legal order to an overarching moral ideal that
would obligate man and authority to act in accord with an
ethical frame that included dignity, autonomy,
responsibility, and community boundedness; this ethical
frame would help cabin the proclivities of human nature.
This was, of course, especially critical in the time just
following the horrors of the Hitler era. It made sense to
heed the famous advice of James Madison: "A dependence
on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the
government; but experience has taught mankind the
necessity of auxiliary precautions." 27 The Germans devised
a moral frame as an auxiliary precaution.
We can also observe the presence of another influence
of Kant and the German classical philosophic tradition:
erection of an a priori system of reason beyond and outside
experience and human nature designed to guide society
according to ethical rules. This tendency toward reason-
26 Life Imprisonment, supra note 20, at 227-28, translated in part in
KOMMERS, supra note 9, at 314. For elaboration, see Maunz,
KOMMENTAR, supra note 20, at 4, 6-8, 11-12.
27 THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
28 Kant, of course, was critical to German legal science, starting
especially in the nineteenth century. The idea (known as
Begriffsjurisprudenz or positivism) was to build a system of law on a
"self-contained, rational, deductive system of rules and norms .. . a
science of law marked by its own internal standards of validity."
KOMMERS, supra note 9, at 46. For a careful explication of Kant's
influence on German law in this regard, see Ewald, supra note 9, at
1920-21, 1931, 1935, 1999, 2039, 2098; Maunz, KOMMENTAR, supra
note 20, at 2-7 (Verfassungsnorm or core constitutional principles). For
an explanation of German legal science, see JOHN H. MERRYMAN,
DAVID S. CLARK & JOHN 0. HALEY, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION:
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rational, systematic, careful, comprehensive conception-is
evident throughout the GG and comprises another trait of
German legal theory, and our topic, the German idea of
freedom.
29
A good example of the German practice of
systematization is the GG's catalogue of basic rights, which
are conceived as concrete manifestations of human dignity.
Each of the rights sets forth concrete realms of freedom so
that each person may pursue and realize their vision, as
self-legislating ends in themselves, to borrow another
Kantianism. The follow up to GG article 1(1) makes this
clear: "The German people therefore acknowledge
inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of
EUROPE, LATIN AMERICA, AND EAST ASIA 976-503 (1994, reprinted
2000).29 The tradition of thinking in comprehensive and systematic ways
goes back long before Kant, including important figures like Philip
Melanchon (who worked with Martin Luther to refound German law
along Roman law roots), Christian Wolf, and Samuel Pufendorf's
system of natural law, which included the idea of morality as a bound
on the state, although he set down no practical enforcement
mechanism. KRIEGER, supra note 10, at 51-56. And, of course,
inspired by Kant, Savigny's historical Pandektist (Pandectae means
Justinian's Digest) reconception of Roman law in the 19th century was
another notable example of legal system-building on abstractly
conceived principles. Working within the Kantian rubric of moral
freedom, Savigny's inspired private law project set out the basis for a
German idea of freedom based upon human freedom, human
autonomy, human will, and human personality. Rights delineated
spheres of freedom in which people could exercise free will, known as
the theory of subjective rights. This architecture of private law became,
in essence, a private constitution, freeing individuals from state control
over private law matters such as contract, tort, or property. The private
law system building of the nineteenth century became, of course, the
basis for the Bargerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB), the German civil code,
adopted in 1896 and coming into effect with the new century, in 1900.
The BGB itself is a complete and elegant system of law, typical again
of the German tendency to abstract and complete reasoning.
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every community, of peace and of justice in the world. 3 °
This catalogue of rights is systematically ordered, making
up a central aspect of the objectively determined set of
values that govern German society. In this respect, dignity
and basic rights have a mutually nourishing effect on one
another.31
Basic rights vest further concrete content into the
abstract conception of dignity. The article 3(3) guarantee
of equality, for example, entitles each person to respect and
recognition of "equal worth." The article 2(2) respect of
physical integrity entitles people to respect and control over
their selves and bodies. For example, in the Spinal Tap
Case, 32 the BVerfG invalidated a court-ordered sampling of
a defendant's spinal column to test his involvement in a
crime on the ground it violated his physical integrity. 3
3
Article 2(2) further prohibits torture and corporal
punishment and forbids punishment without fault in
levying disproportionate penalties, norms the United States
would have been well-advised to follow in the war on
terrorism. Dignity means respect of intellectual and
spiritual identity and integrity, points we will take up later
in our discussion of personality rights. Dignity also means
guarantee of individual and social existence, which is
tangibly manifested in the right to life guarantee in article
2(2) and in the Sozialstaat principle, a matter we will take
up later. In short, human dignity, alone or in conjunction
with the more specific basic rights, is a rich source of
constitutional jurisprudence that provides form and
substance to this driving force of German constitutionalism.
Why the Germans are committed to a constitution of
dignity is an important question that is most likely due to
30 GG art. 1(2).
31 Eberle, Human Dignity, supra note 19, at 971-72.
" 16 BVerfGE 194 (1963).
33 Eberle, Human Dignity, supra note 19, at 977.
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the desire to re-found German society on a moral basis
following the Hitler horror, but one also with deep roots in
German intellectual history. Looking at the issue from a
different perspective, the horror of the Hitler era inspired
the Germans to look deep into their past to identify and
glean what was good and humane. This topic will now be
explored by examining the historical infrastructure of the
GG.
I have already spoken of the architectonic concept of
human dignity around which the GG is based, and this
seminal concept is attributable, in the main, to Kant's
ethical theory, as developed notably in his Foundations of
the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) and The Metaphysics of
Morals (1797). The essence of Kant's ethical theory is that
man is an autonomous moral agent who is to act in
accordance with the Categorical Imperative: "Act only
according to that maxim by which you can at the same time
will that it should become a universal law." 34 "[E]very
rational being must act as if he, by his maxims, were at all
times a legislative member in the universal realm of
ends., 35  At the base of this system of ethics is human
autonomy: man is his own independent agent, and is to
exercise his will, idealistically, in accord with moral
34 KANT, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 39. Stated a different way:
Always act according to that maxim whose universality as a
law you can at the same time will. This is the only condition
under which a will can never come into conflict with itself,
and such an imperative is categorical. Because the validity of
the will, as a universal law for possible actions, has an analogy
with the universal connection of the existence of things under
universal laws, which is the formal element of nature in
general, the categorical imperative can also be expressed as
follows: act according to maxims which can at the same time
have themselves as universal laws of nature as their objects.
Such, then, is the formula of an absolutely good will.
Id. at 39-41.
35 d. at 57.
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maxims so as to realize moral freedom. 36 From these core
ethical conceptions of human dignity endowing man with
moral autonomy, we can deduce these Kantian cognates:
human will, equality and respect as intrinsic worth. These
conceptions radiate through the GG and the German Civil
Code (the Birgerliches Gesetzbuch or BGB).
Kant's influence extended well beyond philosophy and
ethics, and had a decisive influence on law. Kant himself
viewed law as the unifying basis for his theory of ethics. 37
His influence is most obvious, historically, in the
nineteenth century Pandectist Roman law movement, led
by Savigny, who having been inspired by Kant, erected an
abstract, a priori set of principles based on human
autonomy, human will and moral freedom as a basis to re-
conceive German private law.
38
36 "We showed only through the development of the universally
conceived concept of morals that autonomy of the will is unavoidably
connected with it, or rather that it is its foundation." Id. at 64. "The
Kantian moral philosophy takes it to be a demand of reason that
ethics-true ethics- be universally applicable. The moral law must be
valid . . . for all rational creatures, everywhere, at all times." Ewald,
supra note 9, at 1998.
37 KANT, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 44. "Act externally in such
a manner that the free exercise of your will can exist together with the
freedom of everyone else according to a general law." Ewald, supra
note 9, at 2002 (quoting Kant). For Ewald, this statement is the
"supreme principle of law." Id. The Categorical Imperative is both
legal (as applied to external actions) and ethical (as applied to internal
motives for behavior). Id. Law is really applied morality. Id. at 2144.
"These fundamental principles originate entirely a priori and thereby
obtain their commanding authority; they can expect nothing from the
inclination of men but everything from the supremacy of the law and
due respect for it." KRIEGER, supra note 10, at 47, 87.
38 The drafting of the BGB was influenced primarily by the ideas of
Kant and his star pupil, Herder, as well as the ideas and efforts of
Savigny, Thibaut, Windscheid and Gierke. Ewald, supra note 9, at
1897. For careful explication of this, see id. at 2045-61.
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Rooting law in moral freedom was also part of Kant's
design, which the drafters of the GG took up. They
followed the lessons of Kant carefully: erecting a system of
a priori abstract reason based on moral premises. 39 Setting
up a system of abstractly reasoned moral principles served
a number of purposes central to Kant and the modem re-
founding of German society. First, abstract reason existed
extrinsic to the state, obligating the state to carry out the
logically deduced principles of the GG, thereby limiting
state authority along those lines. After the Hitler era, this
was an urgent matter. Core here, of course, is the
obligation, in GG article 1(1), to treat man according to his
due as possessing dignity, as an end in himself, as
'9 KANT, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 43-44.
Here philosophy must show its purity as the absolute sustainer
of its laws, and not of the herald of those which an implanted
sense or who knows what tutelage nature whispers to it. Those
may be better than no laws at all, but they can never afford
fundamental principles, which reason alone dictates. These
fundamental principles originate entirely a priori and thereby
obtain their commanding authority; they can expect nothing
from the inclination of men but everything from the
supremacy of the law and due respect for it. Otherwise, they
condemn man to self-contempt and inner abhorrence. Thus,
everything empirical is not only wholly unworthy to be an
ingredient in the principle of morality but is even highly
prejudicial to the purity of moral practices themselves.
KRIEGER, supra note 10, at 118 (quoting Kant, "the rational
constitution makes 'freedom its principle-makes it indeed the
condition of all compulsion."'). "[T]he only principles according to
which a state could be constituted" rationally: "1. The freedom of each
member of society as a man. 2. The equality of each member with
every other as a subject. 3. The autonomy of each member of a
commonwealth as a citizen." Id. at 114 (quoting Kant).
Most German thinkers drew upon the sturdy philosophic structure of
Kant and Hegel. It was a way to insulate reason from politics. Id. at 86.
Modem constitutional theory is still organized around the ideas of Kant
and Otto von Gierke. Ewald, supra note 9, at 2096. Kant paid careful
attention to the building of a system of reason. Id. at 2005, 2036-37.
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explained above. Based on this principle, the GG sets out a
state order bound by reason, an independent moral structure
extrinsic to authority and man.n°
in addition to human dignity, the GG contains a number
of such a priori principles that are designed to accomplish
this purpose. We can observe this in article 20, which sets
forth the basic principles of the social order. Article 20(1)
commits the Federal Republic to a "democratic and social
federal state."'4  Article 20(3) binds the legislature "to the
constitutional order" as the executive and the judiciary
"shall be bound by law and justice." Article 20(4) commits
the Federal Republic to a "militant democracy,"
empowering people "with the right to resist any person
seeking to abolish this constitutional order, should no other
remedy be possible. 4 2 And then there is the famous article
79(3), which holds as permanent, i.e. beyond amendment,
the core principles of the constitutional order: human
dignity, human rights and the values of a democratic and
social federal state committed to law and justice mentioned
in article 20.4 3 We can thus discern the marked application
of an extrinsic system of reason that binds and channels
authority along an arrangement of human freedom
containing clearly delineated inviolable values.
44
40 KRIEGER, supra note 10, at 95 (Kant interested in separating as
independent moral realm from experience).
4 Kant believed in popular sovereignty, which "can only belong to
the united will of the people." KRIEGER, supra note 10, at 118 (quoting
Kant). The ruler is simply the agent of the people. Id. Here we can
discern the influence of Rousseau.
42 The principle of militant democracy (streitbare Demokratie)
obligates the state and citizens to resist any threats to the basic
democratic order. Klass Case, 30 BVerfGE 1, 19-20 (1970).
43 GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 79(3) (stating, "Amendments of this
Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation into Lander, the
participation of the Lander in legislation, or the basic principles laid
down in Articles 1 and 20 shall be inadmissible.").
44 KRIEGER, supra note 10, at 92.
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The focus of the constitutional order centers around
man and the practical realization of his moral freedom
through the various radiations of human dignity laid out in
the catalogue of basic rights, such as: equality,
development of personality or control over one's mind, to
name a few. Each of these rights is a realm for personal
legislation, to follow Kantian language, according to
universal laws. "[E]very rational being must act as if he,
by his maxims, were at all times a legislative member in the
universal realm of ends." 45  Now, of course, Kant's
principles are idealistic, as he intended. Neither Kant nor
the drafters of the GG necessarily envisioned that man
would always be able to act in accord with such ideal,
universal maxims. Kant's vision of human nature would
seem to be based on a perfect ideal-something man should
strive toward, although not necessarily be able to realize.
His vision certainly contrasts with the more practical and
base view of human nature of Thomas Hobbes, 46 or the
skeptical but practical vision of James Madison.47 And this
45 KANT, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 57. See also Ewald, supra
note 9, at 2001-03; KRIEGER, supra note 10, at 10 1-02 (moral will, self-
legislation), 116 (politics based on morals).
46 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, OR THE MATTER, FORM AND
POWER OF A COMMONWEALTH, ECCLESIASTICAL AND CIVIL (1651). Of
course, Hobbes wrote in reaction to the Thirty Years War ravaging
Europe and the English Civil War. Scarred by that experience, it would
be natural to be skeptical of humankind. Hugo de Groot (1583-1645,
Grotius) also experienced the horrors of the Thirty Years War, as well
as exile from the then United Provinces that would later become the
Netherlands. His experience motivated him to design a framework of
extrinsic, moral principles outside of the experience of any country that
would act to bind all states, thus forming the basis of international law.
HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS (ON THE LAW OF WAR AND
PEACE) (1625).
47 THE FEDERALIST No. 55 (James Madison) ("As there is a degree of
depravity in mankind which requires a certain degree of circumspection
and distrust, so there are other qualities in human nature which justify a
certain portion of esteem and confidence. Republican government
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more idealistic vision would seem to be the hypothesis of
the GG, at least in its statements of an objective moral
order that animates the concept of human freedom. We
will now turn to further examination of this idea of moral
freedom.
B. Right to Development of Personality
Grounded in and compatible with human dignity and
Kantian philosophy is the German constitutional focus on
the free unfolding of personality, phrased in article 2(1) as
"[e]veryone shall have the right to the free development of
his personality .... ." The focus on human personality is
designed to empower people to achieve and realize their
talents and capabilities; in short, to develop who they are as
full, rounded people.48 Article 1, human dignity, and
article 2, personality rights, coalesce to put man in the
center of the constitutional universe.
There are a number of dimensions to modern
personality rights, which is appropriate because the rights
mirror the multiple dimensions of human personality. A
brief sketch will suffice. First, personality rights come into
play, potentially, whenever an action is not protected by a
more specific right. The BVerfG captured the sense of this
catch-all function of article 2(1) in the Eppler Case:
They complement as "undefined" freedom the
special ("defined") freedoms, like freedom of
conscience or expression, equally constitutive
elements of personality. Their function is, in the
sense of the ultimate constitutional value, human
dignity, to preserve the narrow personal life sphere
presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher degree than any
other form.").
48 For discussion of the Kantian roots of the idea of moral freedom
embodied in GG article 2, see Ewald, supra note 9, at 2001, 2063,
2099.
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and to maintain its conditions that are not
encompassed by traditional guarantees.49
The catchall function of article 2 is another example of
the German trait of thinking in complete, systematic terms.
There must be some open clause available to capture
unforeseen or new developments in society in order to
allow a charter of freedom to adapt and function in modem
conditions.
50
Personality rights are conceived in a complete sense to
cover the different dimensions of the human person.
5 1
Freedom of action is outward in focus, capturing those
human activities that are performed externally, in the
world. They include traveling abroad,52 engaging in the
sport of falconry, 53 or horse riding in the woods,54 to name
some of the examples enumerated by the BVerfG.
Complementing the focus on outer freedom is a
concentration on protection of inner freedom through
erection of a personal sphere that delimits an essential core
of privacy and repose within which a person can think,
believe and deliberate so as to fundamentally determine
who one is and how one should relate to the world, if at all.
This focus on the interior sphere reflects the underlying
vision of man as a "spiritual-moral" being.55
49 Eppler Case, 54 BVerfGE 148, 153 (1980).
50 In this respect, article 2 of the GG is similar to the open clauses of
the Bfirgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code], such as, for example,
article 138(1) (good morals, guten Sitten), and article 242, (good faith,
Treu und Glauben) 826, which the private law courts have used as
vessels to capture new developments in society and refashion law to
adjust to changed circumstances.
51 Maunz, KOMMENTAR, supra note 20, at 2-12 (capturing full range
of man's existence; not just spiritual and moral, but material, economic,
and ethical).
52 Elfes Case, 6 BVerfGE 32 (1957).
13 Falconry Licensing Case, 55 BVerfGE 159 (1980).
54 Riders in Woods Case, 80 BVerfGE 137 (1989).
55 Elfes, supra note 52, at 36.
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The BVerfG has been quite active in delineating the
boundary of this personal sphere. Confidentiality is
56protected against unreasonable incursion, as is inquiry
into personal matters that might yield a composite of one's
habit and predilections, so as to gain access to the nature of
one's personality.57 The novel concept of informational
self-determination that developed jurisprudentially has
resulted in personal control over such matters as how to
present one's self in society, including control over one's
words, 58 images, portraits, 5 reputation, 60 and, critically in
the computer age, control over access to and use of
personal information.
61
The German focus on inner life and its protection of an
interior citadel to human freedom has deep intellectual and
cultural roots. First, cultural and artistic manifestations of
the human spirit have traditionally been prized.62 The
inward orientation toward freedom again reflects the
influence of Kant, who focused on moral autonomy and
56 E.g., Criminal Diary Case, 80 BVerfGE 367 (1989); Tape
Recording Case, 34 BVerfGE 238 (1973) (protecting against taping of
telephone conversations).
57Census Act Case, 65 BVerfGE 1 (1983); Microcensus Case, 27
BVerfGE 1 (1969).
58 Soraya Case, 34 BVerfGE 269 (1973) (protecting against false
interviews).
59 Lebach I Case, 35 BVerfGE 202 (1973) (describing the right to
control how one is portrayed as one reenters society from prison).
60 B611 Case, 54 BVerfGE 208 (1980) (describing the right against
being misquoted).
61 Census Act, supra note 57, at 1; Microcensus, supra note 57, at 1
(1969).
62 James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity
Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1181 (2004) [hereinafter
Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy] (stating, "The
paradigmatic free actor, for such German philosophers, was commonly
the artist more than the consumer."). Kant saw the arts and sciences as
"prepar[ing] man for a sovereignty in which reason alone shall have
sway." KRIEGER, supra note 10, at 110 (quoting Kant).
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freedom, including the obligation to realize and mold
human capacity as an ethical duty, but also has roots in a
deep German tradition of protecting inner life, including
the work of figures such as Martin Luther, Pufendorf, and
Christian Thomasius.
63
With the onset of the French Revolution of 1789 and
the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century, concern
for protection of the individual became paramount.
German thinkers feared the irrationalities of human nature
spurred on by uncontrolled popular sovereignty and the
greed and baseness brought on by an unrestrained
economic market operating pursuant to laissez faire.
Germans were trying to adjust to these gale forces, leading
them to intensify their focus on securing a citadel of
individuality from these winds; they did so by
concentrating on human free will-a freedom from
determinism, not a freedom from government. This
freedom was designed to facilitate the full development of
each person's capacities and talents. Individual fulfillment
could yield satisfaction and happiness in a way that mere
economic acquisition could not. The focus of rights lay
in the personal domain, not just in property, a position
advocated most prominently by Otto von Gierke.65
Concretely, this led to a focus on the development of
human personality as an enclave of personal freedom.
63 KRIEGER, supra note 10, at 61. Martin Luther's famous two-sword
theory of the Christian state, for example, conceived of a division
between a person's inner life and the outer jurisdiction of the state. Id.
at 69. Christian Thomasius was a disciple of Pufendorf. Writing after
the 30 years war, Pufendorf conceived of the state as a moral body,
with people possessing "moral, self-limiting . . . sovereignty . . . of
individual rights." Id. at 53. For fuller discussion, see id. at 51-56.
64 Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy, supra note 62, at
1181-82. See also Ewald, supra note 9, at 2053-54 (noting that Kant
called "untrammeled majority rule" a "form of despotism." Id. at
2053.).
65 OTTO VON GIERKE, I DEUTSCHES PRIVATRECHT 702, 706 (1895).
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Wilhelm von Humboldt advocated development of man's
intellect and spiritual capacity, which helped cement the
idea of academic freedom, now guaranteed in GG article
5(3).66 Johann Gottlieb Fichte,67 Savigny,68 and others
took up advocacy of personality rights in their nineteenth
century work on Roman-rooted German private law. Most
notably, Otto von Gierke advocated for a "general right of
personality"'69 in the debates that surrounded adoption of
the BGB. °
A second factor was the fact that freedom in political
life was foreclosed for much of the nineteenth century,
leaving the inner realm as the stage for freedom. 71 This too
was part of a long tradition of acceptance of the political
status quo; revolution was not in the cards for figures like
Luther, Pufendorf, or Kant. Instead, the focus of freedom
66 KRIEGER, supra note 10, at 166-70. Von Humboldt advocated "[a]
spiritual sovereignty of the individual who realizes his highest values
through intellectual and aesthetic contemplation." Id. at 167.
67 Id. at 179-83. ("[T]he primary right of man, the guarantor of
human progress for which all other civil rights could be sacrificed, was
freedom of thought, 'this celestial palladium of humanity."' Id. at 179.
(quoting Fichte)).
68 Savigny envisioned universities and academic freedom as the true
focus of freedom. WHITMAN, ROMAN LEGACY, supra note 13, at 106,
109.
69 VON GIERKE, supra note 65, at 702.
70 Despite the call for general rights to personality, the BGB
ultimately did not adopt them, although the 1907 Swiss Civil Code of
around the same time period did. Harry D. Krause, The Right to
Privacy in Germany-Pointers for American Legislation?, 1965 Duke
L.J. 481, 485 (1965). Some protections of personality were provided.
For example, BGB article 12 protects the right to one's name; BGB
article 823 II protects an interest in reputation, especially against
criminal defamation. Id. at 487. However, the main development of
personality rights occurred through the efforts of German private law
courts. Eberle, Human Dignity, supra note 19, at 10 14-15.
71 KRIEGER, supra note 10, at 41-42 (explaining how writers of the
burger class, especially those of Sturm und Drang, advocated an inner
freedom of the mind); Eberle, Human Dignity, supra note 19, at 981.
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lay in the mind. Propelled by intellectuals, the influence of
Enlightenment values was put to use in erecting a moral,
inner ideal of freedom, based upon dignity and human
personality (an ideal that was to stand outside the control of
the state and politics). The creation of this transcendental
ideal of freedom was a main task of the nineteenth century.
James Whitman suggests another factor in the
formation of personality rights. German thinkers of the
nineteenth century dug deep into Roman law and its
privileging of norms of aristocratic honor, and then to the
aristocratic law of insult, to remold concepts of personal
honor that would comprise an important part of personality
rights.72  A more controversial claim, advocated by
Whitman, is that the Nazis transformed the law of honor
from one available only to people of privilege to one
available to all citizens. Honor was associated with high
status. The Nazi movement, accordingly, "leveled up"
claims to honor from what traditionally had only been the
aristocracy to all citizens, as long as they were Aryan,
including low-status citizens. Thus, all Aryan citizens, of
whatever status, had a right to protection of their
personality.73 Nonaryans were, as we know, systematically
excluded from equality under the law and, ultimately, from
72 Whitman, Civility and Respect, supra note 17, at 1285-1302, 1313-
15, 1317.
73 Whitman, Civility and Respect, supra note 17, at 1321-30;
Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy, supra note 62, at
1166-67. Whitman explains:
The draft Nazi Civil Code, never enacted, was even more
assertive in its insistence on a universal German right to
protection of personality. The Nazis presented themselves as
protecting honor to its fullest extent, in return for the sacrifices
demanded of the German Volk. Of course the insistence on
honor for Germans was paired with an insistence on the
dishonor of others-of persons who were "sick or foreign."
Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy, supra note 62, at
1188.
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the law itself. We can thus see that there was a ready,
underlying, intellectual platform on which to map out the
inner dimension of human freedom.
The decisive development for modem personality law
came in the post World War II movement by courts of
private law, interpreting the principles of the BGB. The
Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof or BGH), the
supreme interpreter of the BGB, had developed a
jurisprudence of personality rights, derived from the
influence of articles 1 and 2 of the GG. This jurisprudence
carried over into private law so that everyone could enforce
a certain privacy in their private legal relationships,
illustrating again the doctrine of Third Party Effect. This
development allowed people to enforce these personality
rights against infringement-by individuals as well as by the
state--thereby providing comprehensive protection to
personality. 74 These courts mapped out a series of
personality rights, including control over the distribution of
74 The path-breaking case was Schacht Letter, Entscheidungen des
Bundesgerichtschofes [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] (F.R.G.), 13
Bundesgerichtschofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 334 (1952), where an
attorney, on behalf of his client, Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, a former
economics minister under Hitler, had written a letter to a newspaper
demanding that it correct statements it had previously published
concerning Schacht. The newspaper published this letter, along with
other correspondence, without replying to it or correcting its earlier
publication. The attorney successfully complained that the publication
of the letter falsely depicted him to the public as making a personal
stand, when he actually was acting for his client. Breaking with
precedent, the BGH found that a person's letters were protected, even
in the absence of copyright, one of the forms of intellectual property
long advocated by German theorists as comprising part of the
protection of inner freedom, on account of this new-found "general
right of personality," rooted in section 823 BGB, itself derived from
GG articles I and 2. These developments are traced carefully in
Eberle, Human Dignity, supra note 19, at 1014-15; Krause, supra note
70, at 488.
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one's own writings, secrecy in medical records, and rights
to one's spoken words.
75
The next step of the development, illustrated in the
famous Herrenreiter Case, was that the BGH interpreted
articles 1 and 2 of the GG to command not only a respect
for human dignity and personality, but also to provide
affirmative protection of personality against incursion.76
Applying by analogy BGB remedy provisions, which cover
tangible property and physical health,77 the BGH created a
damage remedy to redress harm for intangible interests,
such as personality. In essence these intangible injuries
were moral harms.78 Thus, Herrenreiter represented a very
bold step. Through these innovations, the BGH provided
75 Eberle, Human Dignity, supra note 19, at 1014; authorities cited in
supra, at 1014-15 n.330. See also Krause, supra note 70, at 489, 495,
499-500. "The interests in life, body, health and freedom now find
protection within the broad framework of the general right of
personality." Id. at 500.
76 Herrenreiter (Gentlemen Rider) Case, Entscheidungen des
Bundesgerichtschofes [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] (F.R.G.), 26
Bundesgerichtschofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 349, 356 (1958). In
Herrenreiter, a picture was taken of an amateur horseman shown
jumping in a competition. The picture was used to advertise a product
reputed to improve sexual potency. In assessing money damages, the
BGH reasoned that the conduct must be appropriately sanctioned to
reflect the seriousness of the harm to personality.
77 Birgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] § 847.
78 Needless to say, these were quite startling and controversial
developments. Soraya, supra note 58, at 269, 275-76. The BGB
expressly excludes damage liability for most injuries to intangible
interests, except when authorized by statute. There was no statute here.
Moreover, money damages are quite rare in Germany; standard
German relief is specific performance, not damages. Traditionally,
relief for injuries to personality were limited to injunction or, where
appropriate, a right to reply based on the idea that awarding money for
damages to honor cheapened oneself. Eberle, Human Dignity, supra
note 19, at 1014-15; Krause, supra note 70, at 511 (stating, "[A]nyone
who would sell his honor for money had no honor.").
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comprehensive protections for personality in recognition of
the core value of dignity.
In reliance on this work, the BVerfG reversed the
process, recasting the private law interests of reputation and
privacy into the capacious language of human dignity and
personality, thereby constitutionalizing the doctrine. This
certainly made for a more secure anchoring of the concepts
in the legal order, and also demonstrates the seamless
cross-flow of ideas between public and private law under
the doctrine of Third Party Effect.
79
Fleshing out the impulse of this work, the BVerfG
created an identifiable zone of personal inner freedom
ascertainable as a personal sphere over which an individual
has dominion. As posited by the BVerfG, there is a
"private sphere or ultimate domain of inviolability in which
a person is free to shape his life as he or she sees fit.
' 80
This domain includes both the right to retreat from the
world as one would like, captured as the moral-spiritual
essence of being, as well as the right to engage actively in
the world, as covered by freedom of action. The intimate
sphere is a critical part of the human vision that lies at the
root of the GG, bestowing self-worth, social value, and
respect. This shows, again, how concepts of dignity,
humanity and community are interlinked in German law.
The net result of this theory is legal recognition of an
ascertainable Inner Space (Innenraum): "in which to
develop freely and self-responsibly their personalities, an
Inner Space which they themselves possess and in which
they can retreat, banning all entrance to the outer world, in
79 Soraya, supra note 58, at 282; Eberle, Human Dignity, supra note
19, at 1015.
80 KOMMERS, supra note 9, at 328. See also Eberle, Human Dignity,
supra note 19, at 992,994.
OREGON REVIEW OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 10, 2008]
which one can enjoy tranquility and a right to solitude." 81
In Microcensus, the BVerfG sought to shield citizens from
a census inquiry that sought a broad range of personal
information, including occupation, vacation practices,
standard of living, marital status, and the like. The BVerfG
was concerned that the inquiry would yield a portrait of a
person that would be beyond his control and be up for
grabs to both the public and the state. The Court
determined control over personal information should lay as
a right with a person and not the government or inquiring
citizens.
These developments formed the basis of the right to
information self-determination. Here the Census Act Case
was decisive, where the BVerfG curtailed the ability of
government to survey the habits of the population.82 The
BVerfG's concern was that intrusive and comprehensive
surveys of people would yield personality profiles which,
especially with the aid of computing power, would
facilitate the state's ability to access such information and
use it as it saw fit.83 Again, we can observe Kantian
perspectives here: this might carry the danger of converting
people into mere ends for state purposes of statistical
survey, depersonalizing the personal element. From the
standpoint of human autonomy, the BVerfG feared that
gathering, storing, and using personal information would
81 Microcensus, supra note 57, at 6; Maunz, KOMMENTAR, supra
note 20, at 1-19, 1-68 (noting that a state must respect intimate sphere);
PIEROTH & SCHLINK, supra note 19, at 96-102 (noting the enumeration
of Sphere theory that sets out the core elements, in concentric order, of
a person's life).
82 Census Act, supra note 57, at 1.
83 Id. at 42 (This "information . . . can produce a . . . personality
profile, which the person affected cannot control . . . and induces
psychological pressure on behavior."). EBERLE, DIGNITY AND
LIBERTY, supra note 4, at 89; Eberle, Human Dignity, supra note 19, at
1001.
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threaten human liberty. The more that is known about a
person, the easier the person is to control.84
In carving out this private, intimate sphere of personal
control, the BVerfG produced distinct strands of
personality law as a matter of doctrinal law, fleshing out
the contours of a zone of interiority. The elements of
personality law, involving protection of the inner sphere,
relate to control over matters of one's personality, as in the
right to information self-determination discussed above.
They include, for example, the right to control the portrayal
of one's person, including rights to one's own image 85 and
spoken word,86 and rights, in some circumstances not to
84 Paul Schwartz, The Computer in German and American
Constitutional Law: Towards an American Right of Information Self-
Determination, 37 Am. J. Comp. L. 675, 676 (1989).
85 Decisive here is Lebach I, supra note 59, at 202, where the
BVerfG determined that a felon's personality rights in a healthy reentry
into society, after serving his prison term, outweighed the showing of
an accurate documentary depicting his and others' roles in the
notorious crime. The BVerfG's decision was grounded in the felon's
personality right to control how he would like now to be portrayed so
that he could have a healthy reentry into society. "The rights to the free
development of one's personality and human dignity secure for
everyone an autonomous sphere in which to shape one's private life by
developing and protecting one's individuality." These values might be
threatened by public reporting of the crime, which "publicizes [the
felon's] misdeeds and conveys a negative image of his person in the
eyes of the public." Id, translated in KOMMERS, supra note 9, at 414-
15,416. Later, in Lebach II, BVerf, IBvR 348/98, 1 BvR 755/98 (Nov.
25, 1999), a chamber of the BVerfG determined that a television station
could show a program depicting the crime because enough time had
passed and, accordingly, the strength of the interest in personality rights
had waned. At least 24 years had passed, thus reducing significantly
this interest in a healthy reentry into society. In this situation,
communication rights took precedence.
86 Boll, supra note 60, at 208, is a representative case. A television
commentator criticized the Nobel-prize winning author, Heinrich B611,
for allegedly making statements that aided terrorism. In making his
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have false interviews or statements attributed to you.87
This focus on an ascertainable Inner Space helps to support
and nourish the healthy development of personality, a clear
priority of the German constitutional vision.
charge, the commentator misquoted B11. Bo11 asserted that the
misquote invaded his sphere of personality, and the BVerfG agreed:
[A misquote] impairs [a person's] constitutionally guaranteed
general right to an intimate sphere. Among other things this
right includes personal honor and the right to one's own
words; it also protects the bearer of these rights against having
statements attributed to him which he did not make and which
impair his self-defined claim to social recognition.
The use of a direct quotation as proof of a critical evaluation is
... a particularly sharp weapon in the battle of opinions and
very effective in undermining the personality right of the
person being criticized.
Id., translated in part in KOMMERS, supra note 9, at 419, 421.
87 The famous case here is Soraya, supra note 58, at 269, which
involved the publication in a tabloid of a fictitious interview with the
Princess of Iran, and former wife of the Shah. The interview fabricated
intimate details of her private life. Personality rights entitle the person
to be left alone, free from public or private actors, if so desired.
The personality and dignity of an individual, to be freely
enjoyed and developed within a societal and communal
framework stand at the very center of the value order reflected
in the fundamental rights protected by the Constitution. Thus
an individual's interest in his personality and dignity must be
respected, and must be protected by all organs of the state [see
articles I and 2 of the Constitution]. Such protection should
be extended, above all, to a person's private sphere, i.e., the
sphere in which he desires to be left alone, to make . . . his
own decisions, and to remain free from outside interference.
Within the area of private law such protection is provided ...
by the legal rules relating to the general right of personality.
Id. at 281. Accordingly, the BVerfG upheld an award of damages for
the publication.
For an explanation of the wide-ranging nature of personality rights,
see EBERLE, DIGNITY AND LIBERTY, supra note 4, at 59-161.
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C. Rights and Duties
The idea of moral freedom, and the idea that it can be
achieved through commitment to human dignity and free
unfolding of personality, lies at the root of the German
constitutional vision. This freedom is not to be exercised
according to personal predilection, but rather within moral
bounds. The German constitutional order, historically and
today, never favorably viewed unguided or self-interested
personal choice, out of fear it might result in excessive
individualism, selfishness, or capriciousness. This was one
aim of the German philosophic tradition.8 8 The excesses of
the French Revolution were also a major factor. The
unbridled individualism of the United States, with its focus
on unrestrained market forces and more absolute personal
freedom, unrestrained by a moral structure, was a more
contemporary lesson taken to heed.
So, instead, the German idea of freedom was to take
place within a moral structure erected on ethical concepts
that include human dignity and its multiple radiations,
people acting within the bounds of a social community with
its ensuing reciprocal obligations, and a Sozialstaat. We
will now examine another piece of the underlying moral
structure: the coupling of rights with duties--duties rooted
deeply in the culture and community.
The concept of coupling rights with duties is, once
again, attributable to the inspiration of Kant and his moral
theory, although this theory has deep roots in the German
88 Martin Luther and Christian Wolff, for example, working within
Christian doctrine and trying to reconcile its meaning with a new
scientific world, contended that the greater rights a person or authority
had, the greater responsibility they bore. KRIEGER, supra note 10, at
69. See also Maunz, KOMMENTAR, supra note 20, at 1-24, 1-25 (seeing
man not just as a free achiever, but bound by duties and social bounds;
his rights limited by rights of others and moral law); PIEROTH &
SCHLINK, supra note 19, at 55 (noting that rights often contain duties,
especially in relation to others).
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tradition. According to Kant, man possesses autonomy and
human will, and he is to act upon such freedom according
to universal law that would apply equally and wholly to all.
Man has a duty to act in accord with universality, viewed
idealistically as was Kant's want. 89 Man has a further duty
to act to fulfill his moral freedom by realizing his
capabilities, talents and skills. This is, of course, a different
view of the GG core value of human dignity and
personality.
The idea of coupling rights with duties has deep roots in
German law, including in the 1849 St. Paul's Church
Constitution and the 1919 Weimar Constitution; 90 however,
the idea is not only German, but one with deep roots in
89 We can get some insight into this strand of Kant's thought from
Kant himself:
This principle of humanity and of every rational creature as an
end in itself is the supreme limiting condition on freedom of
actions of each man. It is not borrowed from experience, first,
because of its universality, since it applies to all rational
beings generally and experience does not suffice to determine
anything about them; and, secondly, because in experience
humanity is not thought of (subjectively) as the end of men,
i.e, as an object which we of ourselves really make our end.
Rather it is thought of as the objective end which should
constitute the supreme limiting condition of all subjective
ends, whatever they may be. Thus this principle must arise
from pure reason. Objectively the ground of all practical
legislation lies (according to the first principle) in the rule and
in the form of universality, which makes it capable of being a
law (at most a natural law); subjectively, it lies in the end. But
the subject of all ends is every rational being as an end in itself
(by the second principle); from this there follows the third
practical principle of the will as the supreme condition of its
harmony with universal practical reason, viz, the idea of the
will of every rational being as making universal law. By this
principle all maxims are rejected which are not consistent with
the universal lawgiving of will.
KANT, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 49.
90 CURRIE, supra note 9, at 285-86.
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other European societies. The 1789 French Declaration of
the Rights of Man and the Citizen of August 26, 1789, for
example, famously embodied these ideas. 91 Most modem
European constitutions follow this model92 as well as those
countries within the European orbit, such as Canada93 and
South Africa.
94
Linking rights with duties is alien to the United States
constitutional culture. There is no enumeration of any
duties circumscribing rights in the American constitution.
Nor has the Supreme Court implied a sense of obligation in
its interpretation of rights. Instead, the United States relies
upon the democratic process to establish norms that
comprise the values making up the social order. This is
another example of the value-neutral character of the
American Constitution.
91 Affirmed in the Preamble of French Constitution of 1946.
Consider, for example, article 4 of the 1789 Declaration of Rights of
Man: "Liberty consists in being free to do anything which does not
harm others; thus, the exercise of the natural rights of any man has no
other limits than those which guarantee to the other members of society
the enjoyment of these same rights. These limits may be defined only
by the Law." THE DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN art. 4
(FR.1789). Under this principle, the popular will of the people,
operating through the Parliament, defines limits to freedom.
92 Constitution of the Portuguese Republic art. 12(1) 7th revision
(2005) (stating the principle of universality: "All citizens shall enjoy
the rights and be subject to the duties established in this Constitution").
9' Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch.
II (U.K.): "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees
the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society."
94 S. AFR. CONST. 1996, art. 36(1): "The rights in the Bill of Rights
may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the extent
that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom,
taking into account all relevant factors . .. ."
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The GG actually contains few express reservations of
duties that cabin rights, especially in comparison to the
Weimar Constitution. 95 One example is article 6(2),
family rights that specify "[t]he care and upbringing of
children shall be a natural right of and a duty primarily
incumbent on the parents. The state shall watch over in this
regard.,96  Another is the article 5(3), the guarantee of
academic freedom: "Art and science, research and teaching
shall be free. Freedom of teaching shall not release
anybody from his allegiance to the constitution."
The more important and substantial circumscription of
rights occurs through the values that comprise the moral
order, as enumerated by the BVerfG. For example, in GG
article 2, personality rights are limited by "the rights of
others . .. [offense] against the constitutional order or
against morality." Article 5(1) opinion rights are limited
under article 5(2) by "limitations in the provisions of
general statutes, in statutory provisions for the protection of
youth, and in the right to respect for personal honor."
Some of these normative restraints are relatively
straightforward. For example, limitation of personality
rights to the point when they conflict with the rights of
others reflects the Kantian view that a person is free to act
insofar as he does not violate the freedom of someone
else; 97 the moral law circumscribes freedom. 98 Youth law
limitation on opinion rights call for a legislatively
95 CURRIE, supra note 9, at 17 n.95.
96 Related to this is GG article 6(4) (social duty that "Every mother
shall be entitled to the protection and care of the community").
97 An example would be the Tobacco Atheist Case, 12 BVerfGE I
(1960), where the BVerfG determined that an atheist's attempt to
coerce a fellow prisoner to his nonbelieving view violated the religious
and dignitarian rights of the fellow prisoner.
98 See Ewald, supra note 9, at 2063 (stating that the "moral law"
limitation of GG article 2 personality rights "comes straight from
Kant").
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determined framework for protection of youth in the
development of their young personality from certain
harmful forms of expression.99 But many of the limiting
terms are opaque, and call for deep and careful explanation
as to their underlying structure. This task is well beyond
the scope of this article, although some further explanation
may be supplied.
The "constitutional order" limitation of article 2
personality rights means the value-order of the GG, by
which all laws must conform. At the top of this order is, of
course, human dignity, the ultimate constitutional value.
And, of course, there are other core principles set down in
article 20 of the GG, including the Rechtsstaat and
Sozialstaat, which we will have more to say about later.
The import of a limiting norm like "constitutional order" is
that the GG influences the nature of the legal order. Laws
must conform to this value-order to be part of the
"constitutional order." "Constitutional order" is thereby
rendered into a two-sided limitation. While the
"constitutional order" can limit personality rights, this can
only occur when law conforms to the German value-
order.'00 We can see, again, the influence of an a priori
system of moral logic extrinsic to man that grounds the
GG. We can also see the presence of another trait that
comprises the German idea of freedom; namely, the
reciprocal influence of the GG on the legal system-what
we call the doctrine of Reciprocal Effect, which we will
discuss later.
Another example of the deep cultural and moral
circumscription of rights is the limitation in GG article 5(2)
99 Edward J. Eberle, The View Outside: What Kind of Expression for
Adolescents Outside the United States?, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REv. 879,
891 (2005).
00 Eberle, Human Dignity, supra note 19, at 986. See also Maunz,
KOMMENTAR, supra note 20, at 2-16, 2-23 (discussing disputed nature
of "constitutional order" limitation of GG article 2(1)).
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of opinion rights by honor. Janes Whitman has
masterfully traced how the German culture of civility and
honor is rooted in the aristocratic and feudal past, including
the law of insult and dueling, and that this class structure of
civility and right to honor was "leveled up" equally to all
citizens, no matter what rank, to the status of honor
historically claimed by the aristocracy. The movement
culminated in the twentieth century, in part notoriously by
the Nazis during the Hitler time for all Aryans, but then
fundamentally in the post World War II refounding of
German society that we have been speaking of.'0' In sum,
we can see that the idea of linking rights with duties rests
on a deep underlying moral structure characteristic, again,
of the value-ordered nature of the GG, and on certain
cultural and historical roots.
D. Third-Party Effect
Another demonstration of the rooting of the
constitutional vision in a moral order is the radiating effect
of the core norms of the GG on private law through the
doctrine of Third Party Effect. Under Third Party Effect,
the values of the GG radiate out and influence
interpretation of private law. We have already seen
manifestations of this overarching value-order in a number
of the points discussed above, including discussion of the
mutual effect of personality rights on the constitutional
order and opinion rights on honor concepts. But a more
detailed explanation of this component of the German idea
of freedom is now in order.
A dramatic illustration of Third Party Effect is the cross
fertilization of constitutional and general law through the
doctrine of Reciprocal Effect (Wechselwirkung), by which
101 Whitman, Civility and Respect, supra note 17; see also Whitman,
The Two Western Cultures of Privacy, supra note 62.
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the norms of the GG flow into and influence the norms of
private law, and vice-versa. The decisive case is Lath,
which involved a communication rights dispute over the
right of a film director formerly closely associated with the
Nazis to show his new films at a Hamburg film festival.'02
In overturning an injunction prohibiting Lith from
continuing his call for a boycott of the film, the BVerfG
delineated the value order of the GG, holding that, "[t]his
value-system, which centers upon human dignity and the
free unfolding of the human personality within the social
community, must be looked upon as a fundamental
constitutional decision affecting all areas of law, public and
private... [t]hus, basic rights obviously influence civil law
too.'
103
"By interpreting basic rights as establishing an
'objective' ordering of values, the BVerfG was stating that
those values are so important that they must exist
'objectively'-as an independent force, separate from their
specific manifestation in a concrete legal relationship. So
conceived, objective rights form part of the legal order, the
orde public, and thereby possess significance for all legal
relationships."'
10 4
'02 Lfth Case, 7 BVerfGE 198 (1958). Erich Lith was the director of
the Hamburg press office. He called upon film producers and
distributors, and all Germans, not to attend the newly released film
Immortal-Lover by Veit Harlan, who had worked closely with Josef
Goebbels. Id. at 198-200. Suing in the civil courts, the producer and
distributor of Harlan's film were able to obtain an injunction against
Lath that prohibited him from continuing the call for a boycott of the
film on the theory that it caused injury to their business interests under
section 826 of the BGB, one of the famous general clauses of the Code.
Id. at 200-02.
'0' Id. at 205.
104 Edward J. Eberle, Public Discourse in Contemporary Germany,
47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 797, 811-12 (1997) [hereinafter Eberle,
Public Discourse]. See also Peter E. Quint, Free Speech and Private
Lmv in German Constitutional Theory, 48 MD. L. REv. 247, 261
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"Since basic rights form part of the 'objective' legal
order, they must apply generally in society-against both
state and private actors that would act to curtail them."' 10 5
Thus, basic rights must also affect private individuals
insofar as they seek enforcement of their claims and
interests through the rule of private law.
Indisputably, we can see that the GG influences private
law, given its place as the supreme statement of values in
the German legal system. In Lath, the BVerfG went on to
clarify exactly the nature of this influence, deciding that the
GG should apply "indirectly" to private law. By
"indirectly," the BVerfG meant that constitutional norms
should "influence" rather than govern private law norms.
"A certain intellectual content 'flows' or 'radiates' from the
constitutional law into the civil law and affects the
interpretation of existing civil law[s]."l°6
In the context of article 5(1) claims, ordinary courts
must view the "general law" textual constraint not as a one-
sided limitation on communication freedoms. Rather,
article 5 freedoms and general law norms have a mutual
effect on one another. It is as much the case that article 5
(1989) (noting art. 79 GG, Quint suggests they might even be viewed
as "permanent ends of the state ... [that] cannot be changed, even by
constitutional amendment.").
105 Eberle, Public Discourse, supra note 104, at 811-12 (discussing
Liith, supra note 102, at 261-62). Quint states:
The permanence of these fundamental values in the Basic Law
was intended to contrast with what was seen as the .. .
relativism of the Weimar Constitution, in which basic
principles could be easily altered by constitutional
amendment, and seems to reinforce the view that... basic rights
are intended not only to grant individual rights against the
state but also to apply more generally in all legal relationships.
Quint, supra note 104, at 261-62.
106 Quint, supra note 104, at 263; accord Lfith, supra note 102, at 205
(from the GG "flows a certain constitutional content"); accord CASE
WESTERN, supra note 104, at 815.
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can influence interpretation of the general law as the
opposite. Under the theory of objective values, general
laws "must be interpreted in light of the value-establishing
significance of the basic right in a free democratic state,
and so any limiting effect on the basic right must itself be
restricted."'10 7  Under the Reciprocal Effect Theory, the
BVerfG must assure that ordinary courts take adequately
into account the objective order of values.10 8
The idea of the Reciprocal Effect Theory reflects,
again, the German approach to systematic, complete
rational thought.' 0 9 Public and private law fit together
smoothly as part of an integrated system of law, breaking
down the historical dichotomy between public and private
law."' 0 There are positive consequences for private law
here. As part of a whole legal system, private law is vested
with integrity and durability, especially through the
influence of the objective value order.11 ' Private law
thereby is not disenfranchised.
The theory of Third Party Effect addresses another
element to the German idea of freedom that, up to now, we
have just alluded to. Now the idea merits a more extended
discussion. This is the idea of the state proactively
securing and promoting personal freedom within the value-
ordered structure of the German constitutional scheme.
The state does this in a number of ways.
107 Luih, supra note 102, at 209.
108 Eberle, Public Discourse, supra note 104, at 816. "The Con-
stitutional Court must test to see whether the ordinary courts have
adequately taken into account the scope and impact of basic rights on
the civil law." Lath Case, supra note 102, at 208-09.
109 Maunz, KOMMENTAR, supra note 20, at 1-51 (describing part of
dogmatic, complete relation of law).
'10 Von Gierke foresaw this consequence as an effect of his Social
State theory. Ewald, supra note 9, at 2095.
.. Maunz, KOMMENTAR, supra note 20, at 1-67.
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One way is the state's obligation to promote the
objective value order at the heart of the GG. A brief
discussion of the concept of basic rights is necessary to
illustrate this part of the doctrine. In our foregoing
discussion of German basic rights, we have mainly
described what we call the negative dimension to rights,
which most westerners are familiar with. Negative rights
limit state power and carve out a zone of personal freedom
empowering people to act within that preserve. Freedoms
of speech, religion and equal protection are familiar
examples of negative freedoms, found in both the German
and United States scheme.
But there is another dimension to rights intrinsic to the
German scheme, but unfamiliar to the American scheme,
and this is the positive or objective dimension to rights.
The objective dimension affirmatively obligates the state to
create the conditions by which people can realize the set of
rights they possess.' 12 We saw the presence of this idea in
our foregoing discussion of the Third Party Effect theory.
The objective dimension of rights obligates the state to
carry out and maintain the objective order of values set out
in the GG, values we have previously discussed, such as
human dignity, human personality, the social, democratic
state and the obligation to adhere to the rule of law. These
state obligations are part of its constitutional duties,
forming Fart of the Sozialsaat principle we will discuss
shortly.
The theory of Third Party Effect reflects a third iwipulse
as well. The binding of private actors to the objective value
structure of the constitutional order is recognition that the
threats to individuals and their rights can come as likely
112 Still, in doing so, the BVerfG has exercised considerable restraint,
deferring broadly to the political branches. CURRIE, supra note 9, at
16-17.
13 Id. at 16.
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from private forces in society, such as corporations, labor
unions, nongovernmental organizations or other entities, as
from official authority. Accordingly, it is necessary to
conceive and erect a comprehensive set of personal rights
that have broad effect against both public and private
threats to freedom." 4 It is necessary to be on guard against
any threat to personal rights. For some, the greater threat
may come from government; for others, from private
actors. But strategies must be in place to safeguard the
rights of each person. Each person must be given the same
chance and opportunity.'" 5 In this respect, Third Party
Effect protects the integrity and unity of the moral value
order that lies at the heart of the GG." 6 Rights are founts
of values that effect and influence all dimensions of life.
The radiating effect of rights on the whole legal system
helps preserve freedom and equality for all. In this way,
the influence of rights offers an extra layer of security,
helping insulate people from the pressures of the modem
post-industrial globalized world. This idea of an ethical
value order, serving as the basis of law, forms another
aspect of the German idea of freedom.
E. Rechtsstaat
Up to now, we have focused on the personal dimension
to the German idea of freedom, assessing how that personal
dimension effects and empowers individuals, within the
German constitutional system, to be respected and realize
their human dignity, talent and capabilities, and to do so
within a morally situated community. In this last part of
our examination of the ingredients of the German idea, we
need to examine the second major dimension to the idea,
that of the role of the state in promoting and empowering
114 PIEROTH & SCHLINK, supra note 19, at 50-5 1.
"' Id. at 52.
116 Maunz, KOMMENTAR, supra note 20, at 1-67.
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individual freedom. The state plays a seminal part in
securing and promoting personal freedom within the value-
ordered structure of the German constitutional scheme, and
does so in a number of ways. We will now concentrate on
two important concepts crucial to this active state role: the
ideas of the Rechtsstaat and the Sozialstaat.
We have already seen how the idea of the Rechtsstaat
constitutes one of the core norms of the modem
constitution and so, appropriately, is anchored in article 20
of the GG. In simple and conventional terms, the idea of
the Rechtsstaat means a state committed to the rule of
law." 7  In that idea, there is a certain resonance with
Anglo-American ideas of binding a state to the rule of
law. 118  But the German idea of the Rechtsstaat has a
number of other important meanings. For one thing, the
German word Recht means both law and justice, and the
term Rechtsstaat can be as illusive as that double meaning.
Justice can mean appeal to unwritten norms of natural or
moral law, which the courts often feel free to invoke. 119
117 KRIEGER, supra note 10, at 351 (explaining that Karl Twesten
viewed Rechtsstaat as "objective legal order").
118 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749, 2798 (2006) (stating, "But
in undertaking to try Hamdan and subject him to criminal punishment,
the Executive is bound to comply with the Rule of Law that prevails in
this jurisdiction.").
"9 A famous example is in Soraya, supra note 58, at 286-87, stating:
Statutes [Gesetz] and laws [Recht] . . . are not necessarily
always identical ... [I]aw is not synonymous with the totality
of written statutes. Law (Recht) can, under some
circumstances, include additional norms, derived from "the
constitutional order as a whole," and "functioning as a
corrective to the written law." Thus, rather than being "bound
by the strict letter of the law, the role of the judge is to realize
in case law . . . the values immanent in the constitutional
order, [even if] not written or clearly expressed in written
law." Judges should so fill statutory gaps based on "practical
reason" and "well-founded general community concepts of
justice."
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Fundamentally, the Rechtsstaat means a state based on
reason, the roots of which also lie in Kant, who saw law as
the synthesis of morality and nature; the Rechtsstaat was a
practical manifestation of these abstract ideas into practical
choice and realization of moral freedom. 120 Concretely,
today this means that the state in its execution of power is
to act rationally, neutrally, and equally, meaning at least
that actions must apply generally to all and not single out
particular people; that state actions and legal measures must
have a legal basis and discernible content and provide fair
notice; and that these actions must also be proportional to
Eberle, Human Dignity, supra note 19, at 1017; accord CURRIE, supra
note 9, at 117. With these ideas, we can discern again the influence of
Kant and Savigny, who detested the inflexibility of stare decisis and
written law, and preferred overarching principles of justice and
morality that could better capture the organic nature of law.
120 KRIEGER, supra note 10, at 245 ("Kant has sought to establish law
(Recht) as the synthesis in experience of the separate worlds of morality
and nature...."). Kant envisioned government as an arrangement of
freedom. Id. at 92. Politics must be based on morals, and the judicial
state needs a moral basis so that it can become an instrument for moral
freedom. Id. at 116, 124. Accord, Ewald, supra note 9, at 2098 (noting
that the classical model of private law and idea of Rechtsstaat grew up
together, as they had a common source in Kant and his universal moral
judgment). Kant theorized that the state should be a state of reason
(Staat der Vernunfi), grounded in "the rational autonomy of the
individual" so that it could "serve the interests of free, equal, and self-
determining individuals." Id. at 2049. Accordingly, the King (in a
constitutional monarch) was obligated to rule in accordance with
principles of freedom, dignity, and equality. Id. at 2051. Kant himself
never actually used the term Rechtsstaat. Id. at 2048. Those in his
wake picked up the term, emphasizing ordered, formal rules and
precise bureaucratic procedures, but not majority rule. Id. at 2099. The
idea was to secure the state and its impartiality, and protect personal
freedom, through abstract, neutral principles. Id. at 2054. See also
WHITMAN, ROMAN LEGACY, supra note 13, at 126 (Savigny and
Historical School sought state based on rule of law, not rule of men).
The idea was to develop an ideal of reason outside, and binding, on the
state.
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the ends they seek. 12  This last idea is known as the
Proportionality Principle and calls for a close nexus
between means employed to accomplish ends sought. The
level of scrutiny applied is strong, falling somewhere
between intermediate and strict scrutiny in American law,
but not the deferential form of rational basis review. 122 The
Proportionality Principle is an important part of German
law as well as European law.' 23  The Rechtsstaat also
places limits on retroactivity.124 Through these ideas, the
Rechtsstaat places discernible limits on state restriction of
human liberty.
An example of how the idea of the Rechtsstaat
manifests in German law can be gleaned from the Falconry
Licensing Case, where the BVerfG explained the
Rechtsstaat as follows:
The concept of Rechtsstaat demands, when viewed
in conjunction with the presumptive zone of
freedom Article 2 bestows, that citizens are
protected against unnecessary curtailment of their
freedoms by official actions. For legal measures to
be indispensable, they must use means to establish a
legal end that are suitable and that do not
excessively burden an individual. 12
5
121 Eberle, Human Dignity, supra note 19, at 967.
122 Restrictions "must be adapted ("geeignet") to the attainment of a
legitimate purpose; it must be necessary ("erforderlich') to that end;
and the burden it imposes must not be excessive ("unzumutbar")."
CURRIE, supra note 9, at 20. The origins of the Proportionality
Principle lay with Frederick the Great. Id. See also PIEROTH &
SCHLINK, supra note 19, at 74-77.
123 See, e.g., Olsson v. Sweden, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 259 (stating, "[Tihe
notion of necessity implies that the interference corresponds to a
pressing need and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate
aim pursued . . . ." Id. at 285.).
124 CURRIE, supra note 9, at 19.
125 Falconry Licensing Case, supra note 53, at 165.
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Applying the Proportionality Principle of the Rechtsstaat,
the BVerfG invalidated a federal hunting law that required
weapon proficiency as a prerequisite to engage in the sport
of falconry. Since guns are not used in falconry, the
requirement made no sense to the BVerfG.1
26
The ingredients of the Rechtsstaat-legal measures must
have a discernible legal content and basis, be transparent,
provide fair notice, and be neutral and proportional to the
ends they seek-bind the state to specified principles of
reason and, therefore, limit state power and, additionally,
further the goal of securing and preserving individual
freedom. We can think of the Rechtsstaat as a structural
component of the German idea of freedom, binding the
state to certain fundamental principles that delimit state
power and emancipate individuals to pursue their lives.
The Rechtsstaat serves to limit authority more by reason
than by form of government; it is a rule by reason, not by
men. An extrinsic system of reason, it was thought, would
help circumscribe authority better than the proclivities of
human nature through, for example, the checking and
balancing of factions as advocated by James Madison. An
important structural component of the Rechtsstaat idea is
the professional civil service, which is to act fairly and
neutrally. As an active legal administration independent of
126 Weapon proficiency is incongruous with the legislative goal...
[of] protection of wildlife and prevention of abuse of hunting
birds. [Such goals could be accomplished] through more
precisely drawn measures. [The problem here was that] the
requirement of weapon proficiency had nothing to do with the
maintenance . . . of hunting . . . [i]t is a violation of
proportionality when weapon proficiency is demanded ... that
has no relation to the planned activity.
Id. at 165-66 (as translated by author).
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the state, the civil service acts as a buffer between the state
and citizens. 127
The origins of the Rechtsstaat lie in southern Germany,
in the states of Baden, Bavaria and Wiirttemberg, as much
of early modern German constitutionalism, and then the
idea migrated north to Prussia.128 Adam Mueller 129 is
associated with the first usage of the word, in his Berlin
lectures in 1808, but Robert von Mohl developed the
contours of the concept in the late 1820s and 1830s, heavily
influenced by Kant, Rousseau and Montesquieu. 13 ° Von
127 The idea of an impartial bureaucracy grew out of Kant, too.
Ewald, supra note 9, at 2055. See also KOMMERS, supra note 9, at 40;
KRIEGER, supra note 10, at 20.
128 KRIEGER, supra note 10, at 230. The center of Rechtsstaat
thought was the southern states, whereby the new constitutionalism of
the nineteenth century unfolded. Under the program of the Rechtsstaat,
officials were to be considered as servants of the state, not the prince.
The state was to be built around independent officials trained in
corporate ethics and law. An independent judiciary was to work
alongside the independent civil service. WHITMAN, ROMAN LEGACY,
supra note 13, at 132-33. "[Tihe Rechtsstaat was conceived as a legal
structure independent of any particular government or political
system." KOMMERS, supra note 9, at 42. It was designed as a third
way, between absolutism and popular sovereignty. WHITMAN, ROMAN
LEGACY, supra note 13, at 95-96. More practically, the idea reconciled
the new liberalism with traditional authority. KRIEGER, supra note 10,
at 252.
The idea of legal limitations of authority goes back, at least, to the
twelfth century and appears later, in the writings of German medieval
constitutionalists. Ewald, supra note 9, at 2047.
129 KRIEGER, supra note 10, at 253 (Mueller was a reactionary
figure). Karl Theodor Welcher also used the word Rechtsstaat in his
1813 book THE FOUNDATIONS OF LAW, STATE, AND PENALTY, which
was part of the German reform movement. Accord, WHITMAN, ROMAN
LEGACY, supra note 13, at 101.
130 KRIEGER, supra note 10, at 253, 256. Von Mohl first elaborated
the idea of the Rechtsstaat in his first treatise on the constitutional law
of Wuerttemberg, in 1829, Staatsrecht des Koenigreichs Wuerttemberg.
Id. at 256. Frederick the Great used the idea. Id. at 23. For further
discussion, see id. at 253-60.
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Mohl transformed the idea to doctrine, and helped
popularize the doctrine.
131
The transformation to doctrine of a state rooted in
reason and morality would appear to be an important part
of the rethinking of society, influenced in part by the 1789
French Revolution. Characteristic of this period, the
Germans focused more on intellectual and moral freedom,
and less on democratic sovereignty, as ways to reconceive
state authority. Robert von Mohl, for example, posited that
a strong and independent state was necessary for the
realization of individual rights and the defense of individual
and general welfare.1 32 The philosophy of law, justice and
state seemed to be the main focus of the nineteenth century.
This entailed a concept of the state as an active force in the
realization of human freedom.
The idea of the Rechtsstaat became a battleground for
German scholars and lawyers through the course of the
nineteenth century. Among other things, the Rechtsstaat
means or has meant a state committed to: the rule of law,
laissez faire, or justice. For example, in the time period
1815-1830, the concept was vested with an obligation to
promote social welfare as well as promote moral freedom.
With the rise of industrialism, Rechtsstaat was associated
by many with advocacy of laissez faire. But with the
downfall of liberalism, especially after the failed 1848
democratic revolution and the consolidation of
conservatism in its aftermath, the idea of the Rechtsstaat
came to mean more protection of the state than protection
of the individual. 133 Today, we can see that the Rechsstaa
comprises most of the ideas that circulated in the more
131 ld. at 256.
132 Id. at 260.
13 Id. at 252-53, 261,460-61. See also Ewald, supra note 9, at 2047-
51 (Kant was also interpreted widely and differently by various
groups).
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liberal period, before the Bismarckian Imperial Germany of
1871: reason, fairness, neutrality, proportionality, and
securing of personal freedom, all tangible manifestations of
binding the state to reason and morality.
F. Sozialstaat
The final component of the German idea of freedom
that we need to address is that of the Sozialstaat, which
obligates the state to enact measures guaranteeing a
minimal level of material existence so that people will have
a baseline of personal security so that they may live a
dignified existence. Like the Rechtsstaat, the Sozialstaat is
a core principle of the German constitutional order and,
accordingly, is rooted in GG article 20(1), and made
impervious to change in GG article 79(3). The idea of the
Sozialstaat reinforces the objective value order of theGG. 134
From an American perspective, we tend to see the
Sozialstaat principle as a guarantee of the social welfare
state, and this is true. German commentators theorize that
the placement of the Socialstaat principle serves as a
constitutional barrier to any cessation of the social welfare
state. 135 Germans anchor this idea in the constitution
whereas Americans vest it through legislation, initiated by
the New Deal. But the Sozialstaat is more complicated
than just that. Fundamentally, the Sozialstaat obligates the
state to act on behalf of its citizens to secure their dignity,
welfare, and freedom.' 36 Certainly the obligation to enact
social welfare measures is part of this. But so is the idea
that the state has a moral duty to act on behalf of its citizens
13 4 CURRIE, supra note 9, at 16.
135 Id. at 24 (mentioning authorities collected).
136 Maunz, KOMMENTAR, supra note 20, at 1-22-25 (explaining
dignity guarantees man a certain minimal existence, but not necessarily
specific material conditions).
The German Idea of Freedom
over a wide range of measures such as education,
protection of human life, human security, and achievement
of social justice. Further, the state is to respect and
guarantee individual freedom and protect against violation
of personal rights.' 37 The proactive duties associated with
the state reflect a vision of man as not just an isolated,
sovereign individual, but a person bound to, and defined
within, a community. The idea of Sozialstaat obligates the
state to create and maintain necessary social conditions so
that man can thrive.138 In these respects, we can see that
the German idea of freedom involves a concept of freedom
that relies upon government. We might call this is a
freedom with government, not a freedom from government,
as is more typical of the American scheme of freedom.
These social ideas were very influential following the
despair of the post World War I era, and manifested
themselves in the 1919 Weimar Constitution, relying
significantly on the theories of the 1849 Frankfurt
Constitution. Under Weimar, the idea of the state as
provider of the social and economic conditions necessary to
achieve the conditions of freedom reached its zenith. This
social idea was a reaction against the economic liberalism
of the nineteenth century, where faith in the markets, it was
thought, would provide all necessary elements of individual
freedom and security; that experiment did not work. Under
the Weimar idea, the constitution obligated the state to
create the conditions so that individuals could realize their
freedom; but the Weimar Republic promised more than it
could deliver. 1
39
In view of these experiences of both economic
liberalism and socialism, the GG took a more measured
approach. Social guarantees are only noted sparely, as in
13 PIEROTH & SCHLINK, supra note 19, at 25-26.
138 Maunz, KOMMENTAR, supra note 20, at 1-25-26.
139 PIEROTH & SCHLINK, supra note 19, at 24.
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the article 20(1) provision of a "democratic and social
federal state" and the similar guarantee in article 28(1) of
"Ldnder . . . conform[ing] to the principles of the
republican, democratic and social state under the
Rechtsstaat." Likewise, the GG contains few explicit state
duties, also unlike the Weimar Constitution. The GG
provides in article 5(3) that academic and scientific
freedom "shall not release anybody from his allegiance to
the constitution;" in article 6(1) that "Marriage and family
shall enjoy the special protection of the state;" in article
6(4) that "Every mother shall be entitled to the protection
and care of the community;" in article 6(5) that
"Illegitimate children shall be provided by legislation with
the same opportunities for their physical and mental
development and for their place in society as are enjoyed
by legitimate children;" in article 7(1) that the state shall
supervise the school system; and in article 14(2) that
"Property imposes duties. Its use should also serve the
public weal;" and the social provision of article 15 that
"Land, natural resources and means of production may for
the purpose of socialization be transferred to public
ownership or other forms of collective enterprise for the
public benefit by a statute regulating the nature and extent
of compensation." All of these constitutional provisions
provide clear textual authorization for the BVerfG to
protect the values there embodied.
Unlike the principle of the Rechtsstaat, however, the
Sozialstaat principle has not generally been employed as its
own base by the BVerfG to invalidate legislation.
However, the BVerfG has often made use of the Sozialsaat
principle in its analysis, and the idea has exerted a powerful
influence in its interpretation. 140  For example, as David
Currie observes, the BVerfG drew upon the Sozialstaat
principle and the civil procedure code to fill a gap in the
140 CURRIE, supra note 9, at 23-24.
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law to provide for a court-appointed attorney; to rule out
poverty as a barrier to a party asserting rights; to sustain
price control regulations against the argument that it
impaired freedom of contract; to heighten scrutiny of
measures that provided inequalities in eligibility for aid to
the blind; to confirm that human dignity required restrictive
use of life imprisonment; and to strengthen participatory
rights in constitutional provisions stated simply as defenses
against the state. 141
The proactive state duties associated with the
Sozialstaat can carry over into interpretation of different
rights provisions. For example, affirmative obligations of
the state have influenced broadcasting freedom, in article
5(1), where the BVerfG required that the state must
"establish a legal framework in which all significant
interests can make themselves heard and the provision of
Article 7(4) protecting the right to establish private schools
has been found to require in some cases that they be
subsidized by the state."51
42
The most controversial judicial implication of positive
state obligations concerns that of protecting life, rooted in
GG article 2(2): "Everyone shall have the right to life...."
The BVerfG has interpreted this duty comprehensively,
requiring the state to take measures to protect the life of a
fetus as well as an adult; in the penal system, there can be
no life imprisonment except in the face of pressing public
safety 143 nor any death penalty. 144  The duty to protect life
141 Id. (mentioning authorities collected).
142 CURRIE, supra note 9, at 14.
143 Life Imprisonment, supra note 20, at 187. Life imprison-ment
may be imposed as a penalty only in the event of an especially heinous
crime, such as a horrible murder, and a corresponding need to protect
the public. E-mail from Winfried Brugger, Professor, Universitat
Heidelberg to Edward J. Eberle, Professor, Roger Williams University
School of Law (November 28, 2006) (on file with author). In other
words, the right to preserve existing human life takes precedence over
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has its origins, as so many provisions, in the article 1
commitment to human dignity. Article 2(2) is another
tangible manifestation of dignity.
Protection of fetal life arose as an act of judicial
interpretation by the BVerfG, which translated the right to
life clause into a positive command of the state to set out
measures to protect developing life. There was certainly no
plain meaning within the text of article 2(2) authorizing
such an approach. According to the BVerfG, the duty to
protect life is all encompassing. "The duty to protect the
unborn is owed each individual, not just to human life in
general."' 145 Because the duty is imposed on all levels of
state authority, including the legislature, "the legal order
must guarantee the appropriate legal foundation for the
development of the unborn in relation to its own right to
life."' 46 Accordingly, government has a duty to intervene
against forces or people who would terminate life, and to
create the proper social and economic conditions for life to
thrive.
147
rehabilitation of the murderer. An example is the November 2006
sentencing to life imprisonment of Stephan Letter, "a nurse described
as Germany's worst serial killer since World War II, [who] was
convicted of killing 28 patients at a hospital in southern Sonthofen in
2003 and 2004 ... injecting them with a mixture of drugs." Germany:
Nurse Guilty of Killing 28 Patients, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2006, at
A14.
144 GG art. 102.
145Abortion I1 Case, 88 BVerfGE 203, 252 (1993).
146 Id. at 203. The way to do this is a matter of legislative discretion.
However, the BVerfG directed that the Bundestag must declare all
abortions illegal, and must require the woman to carry the unborn to
term unless there is a compelling reason to terminate the pregnancy.
147 See id. at 203, 253 ("The fundamental prohibition of abortion and
the fundamental duty to carry a child to term are two indispensable,
inseparable elements of the constitutionally commanded protection.").
See Eberle, Human Dignity, supra note 19, at 1035-47. Outside of
abortion, the BVerfG has not invoked article I to impose duties on
government. See Chemical Weapons Case, 77 BVerfGE 170 (1987)
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But nothing is as simple as it seems. The right to fetal
life does not, in fact, always take precedence. In
juxtaposition to fetal rights are a woman's right to choose,
grounded in article 2(1) personality rights. How to
untangle the collision between these rights is a tricky and
complicated business worked out by the BVerfG in two
long and complicated decisions over abortion.1
48
The origins of the Sozialstaat go back to feudal time,
and the duty of the Prince to take care of his subjects. The
relationship between Prince and subjects entailed reciprocal
obligations. The Prince guaranteed protection and certain
individual and social welfare guarantees; in return, the
subjects owed allegiance to the Prince and paid taxes. 149
(rejecting any constitutional claim that storage and transportation of
chemical weapons violated GG); Schleyer Kidnaping Case, 46
BVerfGE 160 (1977) (imposing no duty on state to prevent and solve
kidnapping cases).
148 Abortion II, supra note 145, at 203; Abortion I Case, 39 BVerfGE
1 (1973). For extended discussion of the two abortion decisions, see
Eberle, Human Dignity, supra note 19, at 1034-48; Gerald L. Neuman,
Casey in the Mirror: Abortion, Abuse and the Right to Protection in the
United States and Germany, 43 AM. J. COMp. L. 273 (1995).
149 Conversation with Professor Winfried Brugger, Universitft
Heidelberg, Apr. 2006, Heidelberg, F.R.G. BENJAMIN ARNOLD,
PRINCES AND TERRITORIES IN MEDIEVAL GERMANY 72 (1991).
For example, a charter issued by Margrave Otto of Meissen, in 1186,
set out some of what was expected of princes:
Since we possess the government of the March not only to
crush the rebellions and insolent temerities of criminals but
also to show ourselves prompt and ready to all who expect
peace and justice from us, we act by right of our governing
power and by God's help, so that all who attend us in
whatever difficulties shall find solace and refuge according to
the tenor of justice, just as they expect of us.
Id. at 186.
Further, princes and the aristocracy were "interested in preserving
equilibrium between communal methods [of agriculture and land
ownership] based functionally upon the village which made tillage
possible, and lordly rights based institutionally upon the manor which
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This Princely relationship was different in kind from that of
England, where general allegiance was demanded on pain
of force, with little reciProcal obligation of the Prince to
take care of his subjects.
This essential idea that the ruler must provide for its
citizens has survived through today, although it has taken
on added meaning through time. The nineteenth century
theoretical battle over the direction of law was decisive
here as well. The movement toward moral freedom, as
compared to political freedom, helped form the conception
of the state and the Sozialstaasprincip. Attention focused
on the role of the state in securing personal freedom, as the
state came to be viewed as a moral force, above politics. 151
Hegel viewed the state as an organism-a dynamic living
thing that formed a greater good within which individuals
would find and fulfill their freedom-a concept wholly
ensured their income." Id. at 154. In short, "the structural balance
certainly tilted in favor of the village and the communal rather than the
manor and the seignorial," and this led to "agrarian expansion from the
later eleventh century." Id. at 154, 156. See also KOMMERS, supra note
9, at 41 (roots of the idea lie deep in the Lutheran tradition).
150 E-mail from Robert Webster, English Barrister, to Edward J.
Eberle, Distinguished Research Professor of Law, Roger Williams
Univ. Sch. of Law (Oct. 18, 2006) (on file with author).
151 KRIEGER, supra note 10, at 43-44, 125-33; Maunz, KOMMENTAR,
supra note 20, at 2-43 (state must guarantee a minimal level of
existence; although this does not mean that the state must guarantee all
material elements of life). The Sozialstaatsprincip has a long lineage.
Frederick the Great is considered the ruler who was the first servant of
the people; accordingly, the ruler had a social pact with citizens. Id. at
23-24.
The idea of the state providing for the common welfare has roots
outside of German culture as well. Montesquieu, for example,
advocated that the state must promote the public weal. The United
States Constitution's preamble ("In order . . . to promote the general
welfare ... ) captures some of this sentiment. CURRIE, supra note 9, at
21. The 1791 French Constitution imposed social duties on the state,
such as over education and support of the poor.
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different than the Anglo-American primary focus on the
state as a framework for government. 152 Individuality was
subsumed within the state. 153 Today, this idea has come to
mean that man is not to be socially isolated, but defined as
a part of the community. He is socially bounded, not
alone. 1
54
With this view, Germans looked to the state to perform
essential duties in guaranteeing individual liberty and the
security of social conditions. The state became the focus
for the fount of freedom, in comparison to the American
idea that the state is the object against which freedom is
directed: limiting state power to empower individual
liberty. The German movement is wholly different: look to
the state as a force for freedom, not as its enemy. 55 So the
state came to be looked to as the source for moral
authority.
156
The heated nineteenth century debate over legal theory
had further important consequences for the Sozialstaat.
Under the Savigny inspired Pandektist movement, as it
adjusted to the rise of industrialization, the Rechtsstaat was
conceived in essentially classical economic liberalism
terms, along the lines of the English ideas of laissez faire
developed by Adam Smith. But in the last part of the
nineteenth century, beginning during the 1880s and during
the crucial time of German codification, Otto von Gierke
152 KRIEGER, supra note 10, at 55, 125, 310. The idea of the state as
organism has a long lineage in Germany. Many thinkers worked within
this rubric. Id. at 258 (noting that Poelitz and Jordan, for example, used
the idea of the organic state as a unifying formula for their political
theories).
153 Id. at 55.
154 Investment Aid, supra note 25, at 7, 15-16; Life Imprisonment,
supra note 20, at 187; Maunz, KOMMENTAR, supra note 20, at 23-25.
155 KRIEGER, supra note 10, at 43-44.
156 Id. at 64-65 (tracing idea of state as cultural-Kulturstaat--and
moral--Rechtsstaat).
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posed an alternative view: the state as a socially bounded
community with obligations to its citizens. Von Gierke
disliked social contract theory; for him, the state was a
group, not a social contract. 157  He theorized that one
should look to state power to facilitate personal freedom. 1
58
This was the genesis of the modem Sozialstaat which
proved influential in the transition from the nineteenth to
twentieth century, gaining ascendancy in the twentieth. It
is this idea that is now embodied in the GG. Following
this idea, the state provided social insurance protections
over retirement, injury, and unemployment, reforms started
in the Bismarck era.
Von Gierke conceived his idea of the Sozialstaat as a
compromise between classical liberalism and the latter
nineteenth century advocacy of collectivism, especially
along communist designs, led by Marx, himself trained in
157 Ewald, supra note 9, at 2057-59.
158 Von Gierke was critical of individualism and its liberal orientation
of the Rechtsstaat. He did not view this idea of the Rechtsstaat as
neutral, but rather, under the guise of neutrality, a competition among
individuals, which served to empower the powerful over the powerless.
The laissez faire concept of the Rechtsstaat favored the wealthy at the
expense of those less well off. Von Gierke decried this because he saw
it as breaking down the sense of community. Von Gierke decried
freedom of contract for the same reason. His model, instead, was the
medieval feudalistic structure, which he saw as preserving a sense of
community. The medieval sense of community was the ideal he looked
to in formulating his theories. Ewald, supra note 9, at 2056-59. See,
e.g., OTTO VON GIERKE, DAs DEUTSCHE GENOSSENSCHAFTSRECHT
(Berlin Weidmannsche Buchhandlung (4 vols.) (1881) (evaluating all
"legally recognized forms of human groups.").
Kant had an important role here too. Kant did not emphasize private
property. Instead, his focus was moral freedom: freedom, equality, and
independence. Theorists thus argued in Kantian terms in setting up the
model of the social welfare state. Ewald, supra note 9, at 2059. Von
Humboldt played a role here as well. KRIEGER, supra note 10, at 167-
71.
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Savignyian Pandektism. 159  The communal dimension to
the Sozialstaat came out of von Gierke's work on groups
and organizations. He felt that an individual could not be
considered as possessing an identity apart from a group.'
60
Von Gierke was seminal in furthering the communalization
of German law.161  Von Gierke also took issue with
Lockean theory. Unlike Locke, he did not believe that the
individual was the foundation for the state. Nor did he
believe that property was anterior to the state or that a
purpose of government was to protect property. Rather,
von Gierke theorized that the ultimate foundation of the
state is not individuals but community, reflecting again his
communal orientation. 162 Property is created by the state
and held in common to serve the public good. 16  "[O]nly
after the state has been established does the institution of
property arise ... [i]n particular, any gross inequality in
wealth, demands a special justification." 64
Working within the tradition of the Rechtsstaat, von
Gierke sought to preserve its virtues "while freeing it from
the boureois-liberal construction that had been placed
upon it." He believed that the free-for-all unleashed by
laissezfaire had undermined social cohesion, leading to the
domination of the strong over the weak. His Sozialstaat
idea was designed to protect the vulnerable by placing
affirmative duties on the state to protect the general welfare
159 Maunz, KOMMENTAR, supra note 20, at 24 (describing the duty of
the state to protect dignity).
160 Ewald, supra note 9, at 2076.
161 WHITMAN, ROMAN LEGACY, supra note 13, at 231 n.9. "The
beginnings of the new emphasis on communal existence among the
Germanists dated to 1831, the date of Wilda's Das Gildenwesen im
Mittelalter." Id.
162 Ewald, supra note 9, at 2060.
163 We see von Gierke's influence in GG article 14(2): "Property
imposes duties. Its use should also serve the public weal."
164 Ewald, supra note 9, at 2060.
165id.
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of people. He based the Sozialstaat on a moral ideal of
freedom rooted in Kant, but with practical attention to the
problems caused by capitalism.' 6
6
Von Gierke's idea of a state obligated to proactively
secure individual freedom, welfare and security is, of
course, the theoretical basis for the social welfare state now
in place in Europe, Canada and other countries. It is also
one of the most dramatic contrasts with the American idea
of freedom. We only have to consider the Supreme Court's
absolute rejection of any state constitutional duty to protect
its citizens in the infamous DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Dept. Of Social Services,167 where the Court failed to hold
responsible social service officials for failing to protect a
young boy from his father's beatings. A more recent case
is Castle Rock v. Gonzales,'68 where the Court refused to
hold a municipality liable for its police officers' failure to
enforce a domestic abuse restraining order, ultimately
resulting in the death of her children by her abusive
husband, who then killed himself. These U.S. cases
demonstrate a lack of any constitutional requirement that
the state protect its citizens.
II
GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL VISION
Assembling the elements of the German idea of
freedom, we can observe that they coalesce to form a
constitutional vision that is centered around man qua man.
166 Id. Von Gierke looked to the ideals of social cohesion present in
feudalistic Middle Age institutions, such as family, congregations,
towns, and guilds.
167489 U.S. 189 (1989).
161 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (stating, "[T]he so-called 'substantive'
component of the Due Process Clause does not 'requir[e] the State to
protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by
private actors."' Id. at 755) (citing DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195).
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Man is valuable per se, as a human being, and this is the
central principle around which the constitutional order is
constructed. Accordingly, the constitutional design is
structured to secure, fortify and nourish man as a complete
and whole person. A second theme is the social conception
of man. Man is not viewed as an isolated individual self-
sovereigning as he pleases. Instead, man is situated within
a community that is constructed along fundamental moral
principles like dignity, equality and responsibility that
comprise an objective value order; this community calls for
participation and connectedness to others. A third theme
is, in fact, the fundamental moral principles that comprise
the objective moral value order, designed to promote and
secure the welfare of man. The welfare of man is guarded,
strategically, against both actions of the state, through the
GG, and actions of private actors, through the doctrine of
Third Party Effect. A final important theme is the nature
and role of government. Authority is limited by the
principles of the Rechtsstaat, which place a discernible
border around state power based on specific principles of
reason, in the way that the objective value order cabins all
sources of power, public or private. In these respects, the
Rechsstaat limits state power. By contrast, the
Sozialsaatsprincip empowers the state to act in service of
securing man's freedom and welfare. Thus, the Rechtsstaat
and the Sozialstaat operate in opposite ways toward the
same goal of securing and facilitating man's freedom and
welfare. We need to assess further the content of the
German constitutional vision, starting with its parts and
then turning to its overall scope.
Turning first to the vision of man, the rooting of the GG
in the architectonic principle of human dignity is designed
to serve human needs. Man is the star of the constitutional
universe, and the system is built around him. There are a
number of components to the focus on man. First, human
life is considered sacred as is its security and nourishment.
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The BVerfG's constitutionally imposed duty on the state to
preserve life, even developing life in its embryonic phase,
in the Abortion Cases,'69 and the GG's prohibition of the
death penalty 170 establish a consistent and defensible
position on the value of life. Human life is valuable per se,
in whatever form, whether developing or formed, good or
evil.
Because man is valuable per se, as a bearer of human
dignity, he must be respected and treated as a person, not as
an object. Acts of torture, corporal punishment, un-
consented bodily invasion, or similar conduct are contrary
to the notion of human dignity and, therefore, prohibited.
Man must be respected in all of his components, physical
as well as spiritual and intellectual.
Another aspect of this view of man is consideration of
him as a complete person, with multiple dimensions. An
integral part of this human composite is, of course, the
endowing of woman with a panoply of rights. The German
catalogue of rights is particularly comprehensive, including
rights over equality, religion, communication, marriage and
family, education, privacy, freedom of movement, property
and occupation, to name part of its scope. These rights
serve as spheres of freedom so that a person can form and
act in her own stead to further her destiny, as is common in
much of western constitutional culture. The most
noticeable aspect of this human composite concerns the
broad range of article 2 personality rights, which cover both
outer and inner dimensions to human life. The outer
dimension addresses woman's actions in the world, much
like the rights noted above. This is the exterior dimension
169 Abortion II, supra note 145, at 203; Abortion I, supra note 148, at
I.
"' GG art. 102 (F.R.G.). The consistency of the German position on
the value of human life contrasts with those who decry abortion, yet
support the death penalty and those who favor abortion rights, but
oppose the death penalty.
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to a human being whereby a person has the capability to
function and live completely and well in society within the
zone mapped out by the catalogue of rights. The inner
dimension address the sphere of interiority, a preserve of
freedom protecting traits of the mind, like intellect, spirit,
emotions or fancy; the place in which people can "develop
freely and self-responsibly their personalities."1 7' German
constitutionalism vests each person with control over this
inner citadel of freedom, a preserve beyond the scope of the
outer world, unless justified by a compelling need. Thus,
for example, each person can control incursion into his/her
Inner Space, over such matters as personal information,
confidentiality, reputation, honor, and portrayal of
his/herself to the outside world. This comprehensive
constitutional chartering of man's personality is designed to
secure his existence amidst the challenges of modem
society so that he can act with free will, autonomy and on
an equal basis. The plan is for woman to be in charge, not
government or social forces. In these respects, the
inviolability of human personhood is a final check on
power and authority.
The second major component of the German idea
concerns man's place in society. Here the German idea
diverges from Anglo-American social contract theory,
which hypothesizes that man comes from the state of nature
and then forms a social contract involving a trade of his
complete freedom in return for a more reduced claim to
freedom and protection from the perils of life in the
wilderness. Under the social contract rubric, man is the
fount of freedom, and the ultimate arbitrator of his fate,
subject to the bounds of government that he has consented
to.
The German idea certainly does not ignore claims of
individuality and social contract theory. We have seen how
171 Microcensus, supra note 57, at 1.
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the GG embodies popular sovereignty and free will. But
what makes the German idea unique is that it does not
exclusively rely upon a social contract foundation for a
view of man as the founding element of society. In
addition, the German idea hypothesizes that groups or the
community can be constitutive elements of society as well.
Accordingly, man is not a separate alone figure, dependent
on relations with others based on consent. Rather, man is
conceived as a social animal who is part of a community.
He defines his existence within the construct of a social
community. As the BVerfG put it, "the human person is an
autonomous being developing freely within the social
community.' 72 There are both individual and communal
components to man in the German view.
The community within which the person operates is
constructed according to a specific moral content that
includes, of course, the polity's commitment to human
dignity, equal worth, social solidarity, responsibility, and
participation. The concept of woman and her free will,
accordingly, is to unfold within this form of morally packed
social community involving connections to others. And,
appropriately, woman can look to the community for aid,
support, security, and nurture, ideas manifested in the ideas
of the Rechtsstaat and Sozialstaat. Woman is not simply a
lone ranger, left to her own devices for protection and
satisfaction. The communal dimension to human existence
plays a central role in personal development. One
dimension to this idea of community is the concept that a
person has both rights and duties as a member of the
community. The bounds of this concept of a community
constrain personal freedom. The community is designed
as an auxiliary precaution to mediate human passions.
Beyond vesting the content of morality with principles
like dignity, equality, and responsibility, the community is
112 Mephisto, supra note 23, at 193.
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obligated to carry out this particular moral vision through a
number of strategies, including commitment to the
objective value order, Third Party Effect, and the proactive
role of government embodied in the Rechtsstaat and
Sozialstaat principles. The objective value order represents
the core set of moral values described above that fuse
together into a transcendental ideal of first order principles.
As such, the objective value order exists as an independent
force that applies outside any specific concrete legal
relationship. As an independent force, the objective value
order applies to all legal relationships, public or private, as
an element of the community's commitment to principles
of morality based on reason. The doctrine of Third Party
Effect and its subset, the Reciprocal Effect Theory, form
the mechanisms by which this transcendental moral idea
can be carried out. Third Party Effect makes for an
integrated, unified legal system. Committing government
to extrinsic principles of reason through the Rechtsstaat and
social welfare obligations through the Sozialstaat form
complementary strategies to the Third Party Effect. These
strategies serve as constraints on the proclivities of human
passions. Mediation of the human condition occurs both
through republican notions of governmental structure, like
popular sovereignty, representative government, and
separation of powers, as well as through principles of
reason, like Third Party Effect, the Rechtsstaat and
Sozialstaat. In short, structure and reason are twin founts
by which to secure the polity. Reliance on reason is an
important characteristic of the German idea.
The ideas of the Rechtsstaat and Sozialstaat constitute
the final notable traits of the German idea: the role of
government. These ideas embody a certain vision of
government; the Rechtsstaat limits government by binding
it to certain neutral principles of reason and morality, as
described above; and the Sozialstaat empowers government
to act in accord with specific duties that it must carry out.
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This essentially means that government must act fairly,
commensurate with principles of justice, to further and
secure individual and social welfare. These ideas mean that
people can and should look to government for security,
support, and nurture. Stated a different way, individuals
have auxiliary support mechanisms beyond their own
ingenuity. These include the social community, the
objective value order and a government vested with the
Rechtsstaat and Sozialstaat. These auxiliary supports serve
to aid and further personal welfare and freedom in a
manner consistent with the German idea.
In sum, we can observe that the German constitutional
vision posits a polity that centers on man and woman,
treating them as human beings meriting respect and
acknowledgment as free actors, but that their actions and
capabilities are to unfold within a social community that
binds them as fellow citizens, cognizant of and responsible
to others. Claims to personal freedom and free
development of one's personality are important, but so are
participation, social solidarity, social need, and acting in
accord with moral obligations. Human needs, in short, in
all their dimensions-rights, personality, respect,
fulfillment, equality, security, welfare-would seem to be
the focus of this vision of the polity.
Given this conception of the polity, what consequences
does it have for personal existence, presently and in the
future, especially given the challenges of the global
economy? We can observe first that material (through the
social welfare state) and immaterial (through the guarantee
of rights, especially personality rights safeguarding mental
and emotional tranquility) are secured, at least at a certain
base level, and this has the effect of providing peace of
mind and mental security, forming a stronger base and
greater confidence to withstand the vicissitudes of modem
life. Social security over matters like education, health
care, employment, accidents, and retirement remove a
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significant cause of worry and discord as well as provide a
base level of equality for all members of society.
Protecting the many dimensions of human personality,
through anchoring in fundamental rights, provides a human
composite constituted from constitutional culture that is
relatively complete and integrated and, therefore, can more
easily lead to human fulfillment and satisfaction.
Commitment to human dignity focuses attention on the
value of man, and this means that human life is valued
highly so that, for example, life has value and protection at
its conception, as demonstrated in the Abortion Cases. 173
In addition, a life cannot be extinguished even if the person
has committed a heinous act in violation of the social order,
as in the prohibition of the death penalty. Likewise, there
can be no life imprisonment because it is contrary to the
human condition to completely rule out hope, unless these
concerns are outweighed by the pressing need to protect
public safety. 174 Human capacity is such that there may yet
be possibilities for good, no matter how dim things may
look based on past acts or present circumstance. Concern
for human welfare is so strong that rehabilitating and
smoothing the reentry into society of felons can take
precedence over other core constitutional values, like
freedom of expression. 175  And prison inmates can
exercises claims on par with free citizens. For example,
prison inmates "have brought prosecutions against guards
who addressed them disrespectfully," within the German
"culture of respect."' 176 The point, simply, is that man is
173 Abortion II, supra note 145, at 203; Abortion I, supra note 148, at
1 (1973).
174 Life Imprisonment, supra note 20, at 227-28.
175 See, e.g., Lebach, supra note 59, at 202.
176 Whitman, Civility and Respect, supra note 17, at 1306. Kant had
an important role here too, with respect to the culture of respect. As
James Whitman quotes Kant: "To show disrespect for others
(contemnere), i.e., to deny them the respect [Achtung] we owe to each
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valued per se, qua man and, therefore, it is the object and
duty of the polity to secure his welfare and act to create the
conditions so that he can realize his capabilities and this is
to be done no matter what state the man is in, at any
particular time in his growth.
A further important consequence of the German idea is
its ability to handle the rise of new technologies and the
forces for empowerment or truncation of humankind they
may pose. Most notable for us in recent time is the rise of
the computer, which has led to the revolution of the
information age, dramatically affecting our world, for
better or worse. Let us use the computer as an example as
to how the polity responds. Naturally, the computer can be
a force for betterment of life, providing readily accessible
information on anything, anywhere in the world, leading to
efficiency and care in ordering a person's affairs. But the
computer world can severely threaten human personality as
well, for essentially the same reasons: its ability to gather,
canvas, and access information personal to a man or
woman. The more that is known about a person, the easier
the person is to control. Control can lead to manipulation
and truncation of free will and self-determination,
undercutting the prime means by which a person forms her
identity and stands as an individual in society. Accordingly,
the key question is who controls access to personal
information?
In the German scheme, the answer is the individual
person through the doctrine of information self-
determination, which the BVerfG determined to mean that
it is "the authority of the individual to decide
fundamentally for herself, when and within what limits
human being as such, is always a violation of our moral duty: For they
are human beings." Id. at 1322 (quoting IMMANUEL KANT,
METAPHYSIK DER SITTEN, reprinted in 8 IMMANUEL KANT:
WERKAUSGABE 601 (1993) (1797).
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personal data may be disclosed."' 177 Intimate information
reflects human personality because it is an important
component of both the inner person and the public persona.
Accordingly, control over personal information is a
personal right, a shield against a prying government or
public, and a means by which a person may maintain the
integrity of his or her identity. Based on this reasoning, the
BVerfG has extended degrees of protection over personal
data, 78 honor, 179 rights to one's good name,' 80 portrayal of
self,1 image and spoken words. 1 2 The private law courts
have fleshed out a person's private sphere even more,
protecting against secret photographing, surveillance by
microphone or camera, telephone tapping, persistent
telephone harassment and telephone advertisement,
unauthorized opening of letters or peeking in personal
diaries, or un-consented analysis of blood or gene
samples. 183
German and European laws are generally more broadly
protective of privacy and personal information in a wide
variety of contexts, such as consumer data, credit reporting
and, workplace privacy, among other matters.' 84 Financial
privacy is prized. German privacy rights contrast
dramatically with the American approach, where personal
information is not treated as a right but as a commodity to
be freely gathered, accessed, exchanged, and bought and
sold on the idea that it is in consumers' best interests as a
177 Census Act, supra note 57, at 42.
17 8 id.
179 Mephisto, supra note 23, at 173.
180 Soraya, supra note 58, at 269.
181 Lebach Case, 35 BVerfGE 202 (1973).
182 Bol, supra note 60, at 208.
183 Huw BEVERLEY-SMITH ET. AL, PRIVACY, PROPERTY AND
PERSONALITY: CIVIL LAW PERSPECTIVES ON COMMERCIAL
APPROPRIATION 115 (2005) (mentioning authorities collected).
184 Whitman, 2004 The Two Western Cultures of Privacy, supra note
62, at 1190-96 (mentioning authorities collected).
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matter of economic efficiency and satisfying consumer
preference. The split in views between Europe and the
United States developed into a major trade dispute over the
United States' refusal to comply with the European Union
consumer privacy directive in the 1990s. 185 Only in 2000
was the dispute resolved, uncomfortably and roughly, with
a safe harbor agreement. 86 The difference in approach is,
at its essence, grounded in a difference in world view;
Germans prize dignity, even over money; Americans prize
money. For Germans, the image of a person revealed by
personal data is decisive; accordingly, that is something the
person should control. For Americans, faith in markets is
considered sufficient; people trust markets to determine
appropriate use of personal information.
In sum, we end up where we started: the German idea
of freedom has transformed into a constitution of dignity,
whereas the United States idea of freedom was conceived
as and remains a constitution of liberty. A constitution of
dignity centers around man-his worth, his needs, and the
fulfillment of his destiny within a morally ordered way that
enlists outside forces, like government and community, to
help facilitate individual self-realization. A constitution of
liberty centers around liberty as a condition to be desired
and realized. Endowed with liberty, woman is free to
pursue her destiny, as she desires on her own, without
outside support except as determined by the democratic
process. She is in charge of self-realization, which she
strives to realize as best as she can. Our last example over
use of personal information brings the difference into clear
185 The fight was over Council Directive 95/46 of 24 October 1995
on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Processing of Personal
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 3 1.
186 Issuance of Safe Harbor Principles and Transmission to European
Commission, 65 Fed. Reg. 45,666 (July 24, 2000). For discussion of
the dispute, see DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG,
INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 743-54 (2003).
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view. Germans can rely on the constitution and govern-
ment to help secure their interests and needs against the
onslaught of outside forces, like others' use of personal
data in the computer world. Americans cannot rely upon
the constitution and can rely upon government only to the
extent they can influence its complexion through the
political process to do the same. On the whole, Americans
stand alone, to fend for themselves. Perhaps Americans
live in an updated version of the state of nature.
III
CONCLUSION
The German idea of freedom posits a vision of man
where man is the ultimate value qua man, meaning that
human values are the center of the constitutional universe.
Rooted in deep philosophical, intellectual, legal scientific
traditions of speculation and discourse, and cultural norms,
the German idea today constitutes a "constitution of
dignity." As such, the idea vests man with essential control
over his fate and realization of his capacity within society.
The dignity of man is, in all cases, inviolable, the core
animating principle of the social order.
Because the German idea is centered around man and
his dignity, the design of the constitution is oriented around
this objective, which is pursued in a number of ways. First,
of course, is the focus of man qua man, which is carried out
by a detailed catalogue of human rights designed to account
for the multiple dimensions (inward and outward) of the
human condition in modem society. Prime attention is
given to the realization of man's moral autonomy and this
is to be realized with attention to both man's autonomy and
morality. Autonomy is secured through the anchoring of
self-determination and free will in the panoply of
fundamental rights that serve as realms of freedom.
Morality is secured by situating man in a specific social and
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moral setting designed to guide the impulses of human
nature according to a higher moral law. The higher law is
comprised of an objective value order that operates both to
empower and constrain human action. The objective value
order of dignity includes the coupling of rights with
responsibilities, personal actions measured in accord with
obligations to others, and a legal system integrating both
public and private law under the first order principle of
dignity. In this way, the higher moral law of dignity both
empowers and constrains human freedom. Stated a
different way, freedom does not mean the ability to do
whatever a person wants. Rather, freedom means self-
determination of one's talents, capacities, skills, and traits
in a way that is true to oneself, outside the influence of
social forces as much is possible, and in a way that does not
interfere or harm the ability of others to do the same. That
is the meaning of the higher law of moral autonomy.
The German idea also consists of important strategies
designed to realize and secure the constitution of dignity.
These strategies can be grouped around two constructs,
community and government. Moral autonomy does not
unfold in a field of contest, pitting one person against
another, leaving to competitive forces realization of
autonomy. Rather, moral autonomy is to unfold within a
social community that binds man's autonomy to the
objective value order. Man is community bound, not
wholly atomistic. Human character is a composite of both
personal and social forces. He is neither wholly separate
nor wholly communal, but a mix of both. The community
has a decisive role in forming human identity, as does
individual self-determination. We might think of this
social dimension as a version of communitarianism,
combining personal autonomy with its realization within a
social setting.
In addition to the community, the German idea looks to
the state for aid in realizing the constitution of dignity. The
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German idea entails a freedom with, not from, government.
Accordingly, the state is obligated to act on behalf of the
human person to secure freedom and fulfill requirements of
human dignity. Decisive here, of course, are the ideas of
the Rechtsstaat and Sozialstaa, which obligate the state to
secure and realize justice, freedom, and security in accord
with the vision of a constitution of dignity.
The German constitution of dignity contrasts notably
with the constitution of liberty characteristic of the United
States. Summarily stated, the United States' constitution of
liberty is fundamentally a freedom from government.
Shielded from government, people are free to pursue their
interests as they choose. In contrast to the objective value
order of the German constitution of dignity, the United
States' constitution of liberty contains no overarching
moral order and, thus, people are free to act on the values
they choose in the way they desire. This constitutional
design places great faith on the ability of the individual to
choose and realize choice. Not surprisingly, therefore, the
mantra of the United States' scheme might be concisely
captured as free markets and free speech. Free markets are
for the pursuit of economic interests. Free speech is for the
pursuit of identity, voice, participation, or governing. Free
markets are regulated judiciously, when they must, but
otherwise left to function on the faith that they will self-
correct. Likewise, free speech is regulated only in narrow,
carefully justified instances, and is otherwise left as a
preserve of personal freedom of a range unlike any other
American fundamental right. This quintessence of the
United States constitution of liberty is perhaps best
captured by Justice Holmes:
[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free
trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only
ground upon which their wishes safely can be
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carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our
Construction. It is an experiment, as all life is an
experiment. Every year if not every day we have to
wager our salvation upon some prophecy based
upon imperfect knowledge.'
87
None of this is to say that the German or the United
States idea of freedom is better or worse; they are just
different. Each is, as Justice Holmes stated, "an
experiment," and it is up to the citizens of a country to
determine for themselves what constitutional vision they
want to realize, for what reasons and to what purposes.
That is an act of democratic self-governance, qualities
present in both Germany and the United States. The point
of this article, simply, is to lay out an alternative
constitutional vision, one perhaps many of us are
unaccustomed to. That is why the article is an exercise in
comparative law: seeking knowledge and perhaps
illumination through examination of other patterns of legal
order.
187 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
